

TERRORISM: A FACTOR OF POLITICAL RADICALISM IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

Terrorism is one of the Major factors of political radicalism in African politics, and has assumed different dimensions that call for diplomatic solutions for its resolution. Its occurrence is wide spread across the six geo-political zones of Nigeria that has been tagged a “*West African terrorist enclave*” (Gen Idada, 2013). Generally, most scholars believed the insurgency of Terrorism in Nigeria to be political with Gunboat Diplomacy Approach (Cable, 1971) where military or perhaps militia strength is used for intimidation in order to achieve certain non-political objectives, but this paper develops Insurgency Diplomatic Approach (IDA) to explain that terrorism is an insurgent phenomenon designed for diplomatic and political Objectives, as such a factor as the fourth stage (PR4) of political radicalism. This research article creates disparity twixt the implication involved in the politically motivated violence and that of the terrorists violence engineered for political objective in Nigeria, and defined Terrorism as a factor of Political Radicalism from African context

Keywords: Terrorism, Islamic Terrorism, Religious Violence, Diplomacy, Niger Delta Militancy

Introduction

Terrorism is a complex phenomenon driven by many motives, ideology, and continues as a tool of contemporary politics, warfare (going by Mao Zedong analysis of insurgency approach) and to politically foster religious and traditional objectives. The response to it in Nigeria have raised important issues for justification of Islamic related violent tactics through the interpretation of Quran and Hadith according to their own goals, the political intentions of *Nigerian Diplomats (Holbrook, 2010)*, and *Islamic political fundamentalism to enhance Islamic supremacy as encapsulated in the formula, "Islam is exalted and nothing is exalted above it" (Yohanan, 2003)*. Generally, *Terrorism has assumed several dimensions for political objectives, as a political factor. Between the Basques in Spain and that of the Damila in Sri Lanka, it is related to ethnic nationalism (Urzainqui, 1998)*. *That of the American Right Wings and various militia groups*

developed as a mind set against abortion (Hannah, 2014) and motivated by islamophobia (Anoushiravan, 2007)(Handan, 2018), anti-communism (Betz, 1994), neo-fascism (Iain McLean, 2009)(Betz, 1994) etc; a religious conflict between Hindus and Muslims in India; and a state conspiracy project designed against enemies of the state as Iran, Iraq and Libya have been identified with it.

Philosophically, Terrorism is not an ideology, but a pre-mediated politically motivated violence or form of killing for political ends (US State Department) and it has been used by many ideologies for justification of actions motivated for diplomatic use by clandestine agents, and directed to non-political targets and groups of people rather than individuals with the purpose of terrorizing with justifiable political objectives (US Department of Justice). For instance, between 1981 and 1982, RajaviMasud of Mujahedin-e Khalaq political party in Iran formed the National Resistance council and conducted sabotage and guerilla attacks on targets in Iran as a political strategy of overthrowing the Islamic regime of Iran in a secret coalition with Iraq, after surviving a death sentence in 1978 and his political clashes with Ayetolla Khomeini between 18980 and 1982. In 1988, his forces launched National Liberation Army and further mounted pinprick attacks along the Iraqi-Iranian border interspersed with rocket attack of government offices in central Tehran, drawing support from its stakeholders in US congress but was later declared a terrorist and his group , a terrorist organization , by Bill Clinton administration in 1997 (Dili Hiro (2003).

In relation to politics, the ideology of terrorism has taken three different shapes across decades of modern civilization. The ⁽¹⁾propaganda by the deed is the first justified action propagated by terrorist in the second half of the 19th century (Lyman Tower, 2009)which ignite the "spirit of revolt" in the people by offering hope to the down trodden and demonstrate through terrorism that the state was not omnipotent. This Ideology expanded support for anarchist movements as the state grew more repressive in its response (Merriman, 2016). It was perpetrated by proponents of insurrectionary anarchism in the late 19th and early 20th century and advanced through bombings and assassinations aimed at the ruling class for instance, For instance, Galleanist revolution led to the Wall Street bombing of September 16, 1920 killed 38 and wounded 400 in the Manhattan Financial District. Galleanists are believed to be responsible, particularly Mario Buda, the group's principal bomb maker, although the crime remains officially unsolved (Loadenthal, 2017).Anarchist ideology was replaced by ⁽²⁾Nihilism initiatives developed by the group of Russian terrorist with the aims of destroying current social institutions with no concern for what might replace them (Paul Avrich, 1974). Here, the terrorist despises public opinion; hates present day code of morals with all its motivations and manifestation. To the terrorist, whatever aids the triumph of the revolution is ethical; all that which hinder it is unethical and criminal (Max Nomads, 1961). ⁽³⁾The involvement of Religion in terrorism assumes it a transcendental dimension where religion serves as legitimized force conveyed by sacred text or imparted through clerical authorities claiming to speak for the divine (Bruce Hoffman 1995). In Islam, the Interpretations of the Quran and the movement of Islamic Revivalism influence the emergence and

progression of violent Jihad in Middle East and Nigeria, and based on the Quranic principle of ijhadism, terrorists emphasize the Quran's tenets on violence and revivalism in their religious interpretations and present it as a legitimate premise for the use of excessive aggression. As Islamic extremists believe, The Quran systematizes this use and relates it to other aspects of the Shari 'a through its discourse on revivalism (*Amritha, 2007*). As a redemptive approach for revivalism, Terrorism could be viewed in Islam as a sacrament for the restoration of moral order, in the Universe, that had been corrupted by the enemies of Islam and humiliate and slaughter those who defied the hegemony of God (Daniel and Steven 2002). For instance, Hezbollah contends that their rocket attacks against Israeli targets are defensive Jihad by a legitimate resistance movement rather than terrorism (Judith, 2006) (Hizbullah, 2010). The September 11 terrorist attack (Caraley, 2002) with the involvement of Al Qaeda made Islamic religion an integral source of religious terrorism both in middle east, Africa most especially in Nigeria.

The Islamic Boko Haram Operation in Nigeria was founded as a jihadist militant organization based in northeastern Nigeria with the quranic ideology of "purifying Islam in northern Nigeria" for establishment of an Islamic state. Between January 2016 when Boko Haram attacked the village of Dalori, near Maiduguri, Borno State, killing at least 86 and injuring more than 100 others and March 2018 when Boko Haram, armed with small arms, anti-aircraft weapons and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), conducted a well-organized attack against a military base in Rann, Borno State, leaving Nine members of the Nigerian security forces and 3 UN consultants dead with Six members of the Nigerian security forces and at least 4 other humanitarian workers were seriously injured Nigeria has recorded series of religious and non-religions terrorist attacks involving that of the Niger Delta Militia terrorism in Southern Nigeria (Maggie, 2016) and newly developed militia attacks in North Central (Blessing Olaiifa, 2014). The sudden occurrence of the terrorism in the geo-political zones of Nigeria emerge as planned "insurgency" for political reasons which this article employ to analyze through Insurgency Diplomatic Approach (IDA) rather than Gunboat Approach that involve suppression through threats of wars or militarized force because most Methods of attack have included coordinated armed assaults, assassinations, kidnapping, without use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombings (including by child and female bombers), car bombings and arson.

Research Objectives

The main Objective of this research work is to identify theoretical format that best define the cause of Religious as well as Secular Terrorism in Nigeria. Other specific objectives are

1. Provide a theoretical format which best defined Terrorism and its cause as a post colonial political experience.
2. To identify factors that determines and differentiates secular terrorism from that of religious in contemporary West African societies.

3. Provide a defined mechanism through which the politics of Terrorism in Nigeria can be identified as a fundamental diplomatic approach designed to achieve certain political objectives.
4. Highlight a descriptive insight on the fate of the post-colonial Nigerian oriented terrorism modern society
5. Provision of theological background information and traditional overview for justification of violence from religious and traditional perspectives, and the economic and political implications of Religious oriented Terrorism in Nigeria.

Research Questions

Generally, the research question within the conceptual framework of this article is to find out whether the dissemination of terrorism in geo-political zones of Nigeria was designed for diplomatic use or for politics of economy through the objectives of the Terrorist involved

1. What is Terrorism, and what does it mean from Nigerian political perspectives?
2. What is the politics of Terrorism in Nigeria as a post –colonial diplomatic experience?
3. What theory best defined Nigerian oriented Terrorism as “politics” instead of its definition from the secular and western perspectives?
4. What factors determine the emergence of Militancy and Insurgency as an ideology of political radicalism in Nigeria?
5. What are the significances of Nigerian oriented Terrorism with respect to terrorism in western World.
6. What is the Fate of the Nigeria as “de jure” country as regard to terrorism?

Significance of the Study

Generally, several theories have been employed by social scientists for an accepted definition that convey the concept of “*sanctionable*” violence against peacetime targets or a war against non-combatants (Wisniewski, 2008). It involves the use of intentionally indiscriminate violence as a means to create terror among masses of people; or fear to achieve different aims (Fortna, 2015). The conclusion for secular definition of Terrorism is based on implications of the terrorist action sanctioned by the state with the criterion of illegitimacy or unlawfulness, which the international community has adopted from series of sectoral conventions for definition and criminalize its various types because its implication is mainly understood as a political violence of asymmetrical conflict designed to induce terror and psychic fear through the violent victimization and destruction of noncombatant targets (Bockstette, 2008) as stipulated in the 2011 Terrorism Prevention Acts of Federal Republic of Nigeria, and not based on the objectives behind the violence action. For instance, the United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly condemned

terrorist acts and used the following political description which most secular states have adopted:

“Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them”
(United Nations Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism 1994)

The research paper is significance with the Objectives of the violent activities which best defines the fate of terrorism in post-colonial Nigeria era. As Fortna (2015) explained, the objectives involves in terrorist activities entails achieving a financial, political, religious or ideological aim which manifest as intimidating people from cooperating with the state in order to undermine state control, incite counter-terrorism by the state to polarize a population (Caraley, 2002), motivate the desire for social solidarity with other members of their organization which are often murky and undefined (Abramh, 2008), as a manifestation of psychological problem revealed by Paul Gill, John Horgan and Paige Deckert (2004) on behalf of The Department of security of UK, motivated by religious belief (Bruce Hoffman, 1995), manifest as a diplomatic mechanism designed by nationalist insurgents seeking for various political aims (Janeczko, 2014) . *As Nigeria continue to face the defunct economic and political challenges of post colonial era, Terrorism of various sorts emerged as a mechanism of political radicalism due to failures of the top executive democrats or the bureaucrats to solve the macro and micro economic challenges facing citizens. As a result, Terrorism became an insurgent mechanism through which political radicalism is enhanced for certain political objectives, and as Alex P. Schmid (2004) explained , it became a factor to create an atmosphere of fear, generally for a political (whether secular or religious) purpose of securing and protecting political quota of concerned diplomats .*

THEORETICAL OVERVIEW; TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY THEORY

Generally, insurgency is rebellion against authority of state of organization by belligerents (lawful) combatants. It can be fought or be opposed by political and economic actions of various kinds aimed at undermining the insurgents' claims against the incumbent regime (Robert 2009) like the case of Nigeria Government against Boko Haram (Chijioke Jannah,2017). The Mao Zedong theory explained with a practical approach that insurgency occurs through three mechanisms called phases (Yang, 2008)(Dan Jakopovich, 2008). As a social scientific political approach, He further drew conclusion from “Focosim” that Terrorism, as war of revolutionary nature, had its own logic for justification with importance of winning the "hearts and minds" of the population because the population provides the support and cover for the insurgency.

According to Zedong, the first phase of the insurgency is Political work (**Phase 1**). Here the terrorist Work among the peasantry to win them over, and build a base from which to operate. For instance, with the objective of establishing Islamic state through radical Islamic movement, the Boko Haram aggressively recruits members from local villages of Borno State, and gained control of Gwoza local government area as their base for operation. They control Ngolollo, Kunde village, Zalidva, Gava2, Kughum, Hadawa and Hadakaya villages, and wield authority of judging cases, settling dispute and give sentences. They only execute people who refused to abide by instructions or fail to do certain task given to them, or those they suspect take information to the military either in Pulka or in Gwoza town (Gwoza indigenes, 2017). In the second phase, there is guerrilla warfare (**Phase 2**) where the insurgents fight the state, but in harassing actions or against communications and logistics. The objective is not to win territory, but to weaken the enemy while consolidating one's own power. For instance, the strength of Nigeria for combating crimes and defense is the force, and as the Boko Haram Terrorist lead by Abu Mus'ab Al-Barnawi advanced within the Northern territories, they sort for strategy to weaken the military force of the state as its enemy to consolidate its own power for political dominance (Monica Mark, 2015). According to a Local militia leader named BabakuraKolo and the report of Borno state police spokesman, EdetOkon, they aboard dozens of vehicles and raided a base near a key city in northeast Nigeria, in their latest assault on the security forces, police and local militia Onjuly 2018. They then sacked and burned down a police station before fleeing. The attackers took over the base for "more than an hour" before reinforcements arrived from Maiduguri, and took control of the military base after overpowering soldiers and burned down the police station. Again the islamists stormed a base on the outskirts of Jakana, a village 30 kilometres (18 miles) from the Borno state capital of Maiduguri and fired heavy guns along with rocket-propelled grenades. On 14th of July, the jihadists raided a base in Jilli village and ambushed troops near the groups' Sambisa forest stronghold. They killed dozens of troops and about 23 of them went missing after the fighters overpowered the military convoy in the Bama area of Borno state. In fact the terrorist's attacks underline the threat Boko Haram still poses despite repeated several military claims that the group has been defeated (Vanguard New report of July 27, 20186:02 pm with Buratai). Finally, as power is consolidated after weakening the enemy, the third phase ensue through Conventional war (Phase 3), where insurgent has enough control to fight large-scale battles, the insurgent must take control of the ground.

For instance, What started as a "*politics of Islamism*" in 2009 through insurgent initiative, developed into uncontrollable movements through a coalition of Islamic splinter active groups with links across West African countries over years (Yinka Ibukun, 2018). Between 2012 and 2017, Boko Haram continued to wage an insurgency campaign against the government with two factions namely, the followers of Abubakar Shekau who operated mainly in southern Borno State and became ISIL's West Africa branch, and the faction of Abu Musab al-Barnawi that operated was mostly located around Lake Chad, forged the group that splintered into al-Qaeda. For over 10 years, the Islamic insurgent

consolidate power over ethnic territories of Nigeria through violence attacks that claimed over 10,000 lives (Samuel Smith, 2014). The insurgency spread to neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger thus becoming a major regional conflict in West Africa with heavy militia force against the military (Adekunle, 2018). In view of understanding terrorism as a political factor, this article used Mao Zedong theory to study terrorism through Insurgency Diplomatic Approach (IDA) to explain that terrorism is an insurgent phenomenon designed as a political factor of Nigeria Political radicalism and manifest as the fourth stage of Political radicalism across the Nigeria era, namely **PR1, PR2, PR3, and PR4**.

Terrorism and Diplomatic Trends; the Politics of Terrorism in Nigeria

As Politics entails exercising organized control over a human community or state through decision making (Rod, 2013), the occurrence of terrorism in Nigeria reveals a state of politically designed (Fortna, 2015) Insurgency disseminated into the Nation's society for promoting stakeholder's political views among the politicized citizens (Ismail Akwei, 2017), negotiation with other political subjects (John Campbell 2018), making laws sometimes to foster economic aims (Ameh Godwin, 2018), and exercising force (Obi, Cyril, and Diri 2011) (Philip 2009), including using warfare (Linda, 2017) (Mary 2013) against targets within the geo-political states of the country. In the first database of documented terrorism that occurred between 1980 and 2003 globally, Robert Pape (Pape, 2005) discovered misleading hoax about terrorism and showed theoretically the connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, and other world Religions and concluded that suicide bombers' actions stem from political conflict and for political interest. As a fundamental violent activity, Terrorism has portrayed their causes in religious, Tribal, Social and cultural terms but shows a transparent tactic designed to conceal political goals, generate popular support and silence opposition (Michael, 2007).

For instance, The violent tension involving Terrorism of the Niger Delta Militancy was designed as a mechanism for tribal defense of economically exploited and environmentally devastated Niger Delta regions like Ogoni and the Ijaw ethnic tribe but later manifest as *ethnic political competition for resource control (oil wealth) between the Federal Government of Nigeria, starting from Obasanjo's regime in the 19190s, and south Eastern ethnic groups*, causing the militarization of nearly the entire region by ethnic militia groups, Nigerian military and police forces, notably the Nigerian Mobile Police, and resulting to the Nigeria's ongoing energy supply crisis by discouraging foreign investment in new power generation plants in the region (Koons, Pierskalla, 2015). The violent conflict was fuelled with various terrorist activities and hit the oil industry with piracy and kidnappings for nearly three decades (Haller, 2000). The quest for an expansion of agriculturist population for live stock development and sustenance at the expense of pasturelands through violent clashes has become *through Militancy grazing routes and recurring transhumance movement that lead to encroachment of the properties of others in middle belt, and economic dominance of the northern livestock*

agriculturalists by Fulani's Herdsmen causing desertification and soil degradation; breakdown in traditional conflict resolution mechanisms of land and water disputes; and proliferation of small arms and crime in rural areas. Insecurity and violence have led many populations to create self-defense forces and ethnic militias, which have engaged in further violence which on several occasions have exacerbated ethno-religious hostilities (Michael, 2018).

Since independence, terrorism became a political factor which manifest as a replacement of pogrom (Murray, 2005), coupe and counter-coup of mostly the military regime which occur as violent or non-violent overthrow of an existing political regime by the military (Max, 2009), the unexplained plots of kidnapping hypothesized with political links, and advanced by political *radicalists* to partake of their tribal, religious, political and self-induced interest of national cake as their justified dividend of democracy due to challenges bothered on the nation as a middle-income country with emerging market and defunct mixed economic system. For instance, Nigeria is currently facing pronounced corruption that cause Lack of interaction between the government and the society, poor human capital development caused by lack of consistency and greed of the politicians who operate as bureaucrats with series of inefficient and badly executed policies. For example, Charles Soludo, the chief economic adviser to Obasanjo, established the national economics employment, decreasing poorness and guiding the reorientation values.

However, the demands woefully failed to reach its objectives (Paul C Nwabuikwu, 2015). With the poor agro development, there is demand for an expansion of livestock and production of agro products to meet economic needs of international demands, but Insecurity and violence have led many populations to create self-defense forces and ethnic militias, which have engaged in further violence and political interests. With the massive implication of corruption in every economic sector the level of poverty remains unacceptable averaging 7.4% according to the Nigeria economic report released in July 2014 by the World Bank Yusuf (2014), and led to the quest for aggressive stakeholder's takeover and conspiracies of interest through various political means that manifest as violent and non-political means. Going by the above analysis, the politics of Terrorism in Nigeria is a diplomatic insurgent mechanism stems from different political dimensions. The first dimension is a ⁽¹⁾**Mechanism for Resource Control**. Resource control is the biggest obstacle to the actualization of true federalism in Nigeria. As a controversial political issue which resurfaces from time to time via politically derived strategies like Abori Accord, National confab agenda, or a political motivating factor for Biafran Agitation, Resource control has been a contentious political issue that has not been addressed-over the years. The agitation for it by the oil producing states in the Niger-Delta is one of the major challenges confronting the country, as well an obstacle to the actualization of true federalism in Nigeria. The quest for its agitation became clear as the FG gives its states more fiscal responsibilities and yet deny them access to maximize their areas of natural comparative advantage (.). The quest for resource control has been a contentious issue which had been settled by the 1960 Independence and 1963

Constitutions. It was the law of Nigeria before and after independence that the federating units, the regions controlled their economic and finances, keeping 50 per cent of all revenues to the Federation Account, out of which 30 per cent was shared among the regions, leaving 20 per cent to the Federal Government (LekeSalaudeen 2018). The original economic mandate was interrupted by military and its interruption became a disrupted mechanism which caused the development of various Militant groups for maintenance of status quo. The call for the return to status quo by Oil developing states is to give the federating units the control of their economic activities and finances. The second political dimension is a ⁽²⁾**Factor for Political supremacy between Ethnic tribes/Religion as independent structure of governance and Nigeria as a Political state**. The quest for supremacy between religion and State has been a long battle since the church lost its global political control from the dawn of British Empire from Rome (Pecknold 2010).

In Nigerian society, the degree of political separation between Religion and the state as a secular political structure is determined by the legal structures and prevalent legal views that define the proper relationship between Islam, Christianity and Traditional Religion, and Nigeria as a separate state. The Arms of Nigerian Democracy length principle proposes a relationship wherein the two entities interact as organizations independent of the authority of the other. In one hand the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community's understanding of Islam entails that Islamic principles state that the politics of government should be separate from the doctrine of religion. Special preference should not be given to a Muslim over a non-Muslim. On the other hand, Islamic political ideology states that the theology of Islamic theocracy entails a government of which Allah delegates political power to the current rulers who should be responsible to Allah for his use of its power (Lyman Tower 2009). The battle for establishment of Islamic state in Nigeria has been a long Hypothesized phenomenon which question if Muslims see “Democracy” as a western ideology which should be rejected as opposed to Islamic fundamentalism or a modern practice of Jahiliya i.e. a period of ignorance (of Allah’s Knowledge) and (economic and political) barbarism which should be replaced with a theocratic system of Government where Allah rules with the roles of Imams to free the Islamic society from the influence of the West. The objective of Boko Haram insurgency is a demonstration of the quest for establishment of “*Islamic theocratic government where Allah rules*’ and not a democratic government setup up by western secular ideology. In fact, Boko Haram seeks the establishment of an Islamic state in Nigeria. It opposes the Westernization of Nigerian society and the concentration of the wealth of the country among members of small political elite, mainly in the Christian south of the country (Bartolotta 2011). It was founded upon the principles of the Khawaarij advocating Sharia law, and developed into a Jihadist group in 2009. The movement is diffused without Salafi doctrine, but tends to center their belief on strict adherence to Wahhibism, which is an extremely strict form of Islam that sees many other forms of Islam as idolatrous. In other to achieve the global vision of global Islamic brotherhood, the Boko Haram insurgency was established in Nigeria through Islamic political

fundamentalism with the main goal was of “*purifying Islam in northern Nigeria*” (Iyekekpolo 2016) for enhancement of Islamic religious supremacy; thus terrorism is a political factor for religious politics. The third politics is a⁽³⁾ **Factor for Intellectual Colonization Policy**. Since the Movements for *laïcité* initiated in France for discouragement of religious involvement in government affairs, especially prevention of religious influences in the determination of state policies (Rene 1999)(Madeley, John, Zsolt 2003), and the separation of church and state in the United

States, religion has been making alarming and competitive movement for intellectual dominance globally. The political nature of Nigeria requires further and amended definition to understand if it is a Political state existing with religion as its state Religion as de factor Country or as de jure country, a Political state with its own regulatory principles due to the aggressive campaign for institution of Sharia Law and Christian and Islamic Knowledge in the Education curriculum and in regulation of Nigeria citizen, and their battle for supremacy against Nigerian Civic Education or citizenship education in the Education sector (Ebuka Nwankwo 2017) entails a competition for intellectual colonialism, with Islam canvassing for aggressive takeover against secular Knowledge through Usman dan Fodio Jihadist movement in 19th century (Loimeier 2011) , the fundamental movement of Mohammed MarwaMaitatsine which started in Kano in the late 1970s and operated throughout the 1980s (Adesoji 2011) (Adamu 2010) , the Quranists, or 'Yan Kala Kato fundamentalism who rejected the authority of hadith(Timawus 2012) (Abiodun 2013) and other Islamic oriented fundamental approaches in Nigeria . In one hand, Christian, while romancing with the State, had its knowledge uphold Christian religious intellectualism which entails doctrines of divine and human action, wherein the faculty of intellect precedes, and is superior to, the faculty of the will. On the other hand, Islam in Nigeria sees western secular knowledge as a corrupt system that should be regulated with Sharia to enhance transparency in a religious government operating with a theological administration. Originally, the philosophy of book Haram is based on Sunni Islam, and the terrorist group sees western civilization as *being sinful and abhors modern science and technology* based on *al-walā' wa-l-barā'*, which for Boko Haram means exclusive loyalty (*al-walā'*) to “true” Muslims and disavowal (*al-barā'*) of anyone the group considers an infidel (Alexander 2015) . The group openly deprecates education that comes from the West, and it assumed a smack of hypocrisy or ignorance of Sunnis’ world-view because most Asian countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Syria. In fact, about 90 percent of Muslims in the world are Sunnis, many of whom have embraced Western civilization. With their goal to “*purify Islam in northern Nigeria*”, they foster through violence the Sharia law to governs religious, political and socio-economic lives of Muslims, and also Arabic education based on Islamic orientation (Itaobong 2018) and targets the state as well as both Muslim and Christian civilians for advancing two ideological stances: rejection of secular government and opposition to Western-style education to foster Islamic knowledge in west African states.

The Fourth is ⁽⁴⁾ **Factors for theological justification of violence for political objectives**. In contrast to western approach towards Terrorism, Bruce Hoffman (1995) gave a radical explanation of Religious related terrorism with systematic approach for its theological justification. He explained that violence first and foremost is a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demands or imperative for the religious terrorists. Thus he stated;

“Terrorism assumes a transcendental dimension, and its perpetrators are thereby unconstrained by the political, moral, or practical constraints that seem to affect other terrorist.... Thus, religion serves as legitimized force- conveyed by sacred text or imparted through clerical authorities claiming to speak for the divine” (pg. 272)

Islamic law stipulates detailed regulations for the use of violence which Islamic terrorists employed for justification of actions; hence a legitimized force for action. The Islamic terrorists have relied dogmatically on particular interpretations of the tenets of the Quran and the Hadith. They cite these scriptures to justify violent tactics including mass murder, genocide, child-molestation and slavery which is disguised under the auspice of kidnapping (Greg 2014). In a number of the worst-affected Muslim-majority regions, these terrorists have been met by armed, independent resistance groups (Constance 2015), State Military or state actors and their proxies, and politically liberal Muslim protesters deployed to control the militate violent conflict. The violence and terrorists attacks of Fulani herdsman mainly in the middle belt of Nigeria has been justified by The Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigerian as a self-defense mechanism (Fidelis 2016) hinging their cause to Boko Haram’s invasion of the Fulani territories in Kaduna, Zamfara, Kebbi, Katsina etc, stealing of millions of Cattles and since Islamic religion does not condone Violence, it does believe in self-defence ((Puniyani 2005) because it would be equally inappropriate to fail to understand the conditions under which believers might feel justified in acting violently against those whom their tradition feels should be opposed(Hood, Hill, Peter, SPilka 2009). *On favorable circumstances*, the Quranic exposition on resisting aggression, oppression and injustice lays down the parameters within which fighting or the use of violence is legitimate, because advocates of violence use the Quran as the criterion for when violence is legitimate ((Muzaffar 2002). Through the Quranic justification of violence, Boko Haram Terrorism was designed as a religiously-legitimated violent movement of Islamism to consolidate the fundamental jihad tradition and become a part of a proclaimed Caliphate with a non-state military force working to establish a new, post-Westphalian polity and attempts to convert globalization into a process of global Islamization, imposing an extremist interpretation of Islam (John 2015).

Nigeria and Political Radicalism

In Nigeria, there are various political ideologies formulated by political extremists to enhance retrogressive politics (Douglas Anele 2018) which focus on alteringsocial structures, public policy and constitutional mandate instead of embracing the politics of

dynamic revolution or employing diplomatic means and changing value systems in fundamental ways. With the occurrence of conflicts and conspiracies of interests in Nigeria politics, the current foundation and principles on which Nigerian constitution is operated over the years particularly since the advent of democracy has not in any way reflected a true federalism in its practical sense. As more citizens of the country's ethnic tribe becomes enfranchised or enter the political arena, a wider variety of diverse perspectives contribute to public deliberation with diversity of interest developed for stakeholders that calls for a challenge of national policy. For instance, the history of Nigerian politics has produced various forms of political corruption like economic sabotage, extortion, cronyism, nepotism, patronage, graft, and embezzlement of public funds both at the National and state level since over 50 years of independence. While corruption may facilitate criminal enterprise such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and trafficking, it is not restricted to these activities, but has indirectly indoctrinated Nigerian politicians into a radical means of power quests and consolidation of Wealth. Other conditions where political tensions have mounted are causing long history of electoral rigging and fraud and have challenged possibilities for bringing citizens into the political arena and increasingly becoming common practices in Nigeria's democratic process (Josephine Ada 2018). The implications of electoral malpractices in Nigeria have been so contested that the conditions for the survival of the democratic order have been compromised.

The compromised system has permitted the formation of political party politics that feed on these lapses, or ***alternatively an aggressively radical approached through which the political plotters would achieve their self imposed political interest***, rather than ethically engaging citizens in ways that conforms to constitutional provisions. With the abuse of power, the politicians employed anti-party practices such as using money, thug and sometimes the police, to eliminate opponents, and employed a radical approach to support self imposed ethical principles. As the slogan entails, "*Unlimited power is apt to corrupt the minds of those who possess it*" (Safire 2008), and "*Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.*" (Dalberg-Acton, 1907), the Nigerian political structures had been used by key stakeholders for illegitimate private gain; Misuse of government power for repression of political opponents and general police brutality, which philosophically is considered a justified ideology of political radicalism. Across the 58 years of independence, the below mechanism has been developed as a factor of radical political system. First Nigerian political radicalism manifest as Coup as its Political radicalism 1 (**PR1**), then followed by Genocide and Pogrom as **PR 1**, Kidnapping **PR3**, and finally Terrorism as **PR 4**.

1. Coup D'état

As the name entails a type of political revolution where the illegal and overt seizure of a state by the military or other elites within the state apparatus occurs, the 1966 Nigerian coup d'état was a widespread military revolution referred to as the coup of the Five

Majors (Ekwe 1995) employed by the suspicious Igbo coup plotters which involved the killings of the Northern political leaders, the Premier of the Western region, Ladoke Akintola and Yoruba senior military officers. It was the first radical Military political revolution in the short life of Nigeria's nascent second democracy due to Claims of electoral fraud. The coup was Hypothesized to dismantle the Northern-dominated power structure as majors sought to spring Action Group leader Obafemi Awolowo out of jail and make him head of the new government. The efforts of the military to take power were thwarted by Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi who suppressed coup operations in the South as assumed head of State on 16 January (Reuben 2000) after the majors surrendered. Aguiyi-Ironsi in his revolutionary change of government and political power suspended the constitution and dissolved parliament, abolished the regional confederated government and pursued unitary like policies hitherto favoured by the NCNC, having apparently been influenced by NCNC political philosophy.

Ironsi placed the coup plotters in the military on full pay and promoted some majors who were apparently awaiting trial when released. The coup, despite its failure and since no repercussion was meted out to coup plotters and since no significant Igbo political leaders were affected was widely perceived as having benefited mostly the Igbo, and as such an Igbo radical political plot designed for change of government because most of the known coup plotters were Igbos, and the military and political leadership of Western and Northern regions had been largely bloodily eliminated while Eastern military/political leadership was largely untouched. General Aguiyi Ironsi later appointed Colonel Hassan Katsina to govern the Northern Region, indicating some willingness to maintain cooperation with this bloc and national quota (Ekwe 1995) as he preferentially released northern politicians from jail. He was later overthrown through counter coup by the northern politicians. The release of the Northern politicians and maintenance of the British armies in Nigeria enabled the North to plan for a counter coup for his overthrow and installed Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon as Supreme Commander of the Nigerian Armed Forces. The counter-coup plotters first initiated the mechanism as a mutiny at roughly midnight on July 28, 1966 and was a reaction to the killings of Northern politicians and Officers by mostly Igbo soldiers on January 15, 1966 and considered using the opportunity as a radical political means to withdraw from the federation themselves (Siollum 2009), but effort fails as Gowon was urged by Ambassadors from Britain and the United States to maintain control over the whole country. Gowon followed this plan, repealing the Unification Decree, announcing a return to the federal system. As civilian attention clamored against the military regime, the inclination of ethnic dominance became manifest leading to the politics of **PR 2**.

2. Ethnic Cleansing: Pogrom and Genocide

Within the same year of 1966, pogrom, variously described as Genocide, was mastermind by northern soldiers for complete extermination of Igbos from the North, but diplomatically developed as a radical political fanaticism to supplant the ideology of coup against the Government; thus a politics against the ruled, and not against the leaders. The massacres were committed against Igbo people and other people of southern

Nigerian origin living in northern Nigeria starting in May 1966 and reaching a peak after 29 September 1966 with a perception that the Igbos lack humility and are innately evil which result in popular hostility (Murray 2005). As a result of the military involvement, an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 Igbos were killed (Akinnyemi 1972), while more conservative estimates put the casualties at over thirty thousand. This spree of killings carried on into early October and was carried out by civilians sometimes aided by army troops and swept the entire north. It has been described as the most painful and provocative incident leading to the Nigeria-Biafra war for northern political dominance. In the verge of achieving a political aim through Genocide and pogrom, Adam Jones (2006) stated:

“..if a dominant group of people has little in common with a marginalized group of people, it is easy for the dominant group to define the other as subhuman. As a result, the marginalized group might be labeled as a threat that must be eliminated...” (p.26)

As the civilian politics supplant the military regime, the **PR 3** became a political factor through God-fatherism process.

3. The Hypothesis of Kidnapping in Nigerian Politics

Prior to colonial Nigeria, kidnapping became factors of sourcing for slaves for commercial slavery. After its abolition, kidnapping assumed a measure for ritual objectives and continued in many countries and regions of West Africa, and it gained ethical acceptance of “*Fetish and animist beliefs*” most especially in Nigeria. From inception of Obasanjo’s civilian regime, political assumed a political dimension of factors political interests (Dennis 2017). For instance, the Niger Delta militants used kidnapping of targeted foreigners, especially Americans and the British, *to draw attention to their plight of environmental degradation, caused by oil and gas exploration and production*. The hostages were usually kept for a week and released after a press conference, which will be broadcast by CNN and BBC. **This trend continued and actually brought the desired publicity to the Niger Delta politics.** As an illegal crime, Kidnapping has been hypothesized by nationalist as a manifestation of problems with education, corruption, high unemployment rate, Religion and terrorism in Nigeria, as Nigeria is assumed one of the most interesting sites for international criminal organizations and the criminal gangs in the country seize every opportunity to abduct people (George 2017). In its *Express type*, Kidnapping is employed for abduction where a small immediate ransom is demanded, often by the victim or for political interest through a dynamic strategy which diplomatically thwart the opinion pool of its illegality in Nigeria political arena, through *God-fatherism* process. The political concept of *God-fatherism* remains fairly a phenomenon for interplay of vices and ethical principles, and a link to political radicalism Nigerian politics. Its development thrives in the polity of Nigerian politics in which state power is perceived as a commodity to be possessed and used to acquire other possessions through any means.

Since these individuals in Nigeria become too powerful to dictate for the rest, the integrity of the process of choosing leaders is compromised, and leadership a question of

loyalty. The godfatherism phenomenon emerges as an illegal enterprise, but because this practice is deeply rooted in the political process itself, it possesses tremendous challenges to efforts at reclaiming democracy for the people. State power, here, is heavily commodified, and the struggle for the exercise of this power restricts access to power from the majority poor. The highly privileged minority class constitutes the dominant class in the Nigeria political setup, who control the affairs of government. In the case of political crisis between Chris Ngige and chief Chris Uba (*aself acclaimed most powerful godfather of 2003 era*), kidnapping was used by the Godfather to “*Avenge himself in the way and manner adjudged by him as fitting and adequate*” (emphasis in original) in case of any breach by Ngige that could not be settled through mediation. As the relationship between Ngige and Uba deteriorated rapidly, the political aura the godfather began manifesting in Anambra politics (Sahara Reporters 2006). In July 2003 Governor Ngige was kidnapped by armed policemen and forced at gunpoint to sign a “letter of resignation spelled out in remarkably explicit fashion in a written “contract” and “declaration of loyalty” that Ngige signed prior to the election, and to sign a pledge that he would pay the Good Father the sum of N3 billion (\$23 million) immediately after assuming office (According to Ngiges’ report in Human right Watch Interview). In the plight of fighting kidnapping as a criminalized act by FG, Terrorism, as **PR 4**, assumed an uncontrollably tremendous mechanism of political factor and can be developed into the politics of Ethno-Tribal Dominance (ETD) as **PR5** in contemporary Nigerian politics.

Conclusion: The Fate of Terrorism in Nigerian Politics

While Terrorism is facing the challenge of stability due to revolutionary mechanism designed to curtail its operation through a legitimate process, its fate in the nearest future will depend on its sustainability through politics, Religion and the interest of the stake holders of Nigerian politics. Its control also requires the assistance of foreign forces and the co-operation of neighboring West African countries that share common boundaries with Nigeria. Generally, Political ideology serves good purposes when it is favorable to the generality of the people, and the quest to tackle terrorism and actualize the stability of Nigerian politics is certain (Ms Patricia 2018) if the correct legitimate measures are taking coupled with the balance of democratic power and economic stability to tackle wrong logistic requirements employed by key players to facilitate electoral malpractice, reshape the mindset of Nigerian politicians who use thugs, Godfatherism process and violence to remain permanently fixated on obtaining victory by all means possible. Effort should be made by the Federal Government to enhance A/T/I in the public administrative system to strengthen government policies developed to prevent and control political radicalism like hate Speech Act, anti –blasphemy policy, Anti-Kidnapping Act etc. further effort should be made balance the economic, social and emotional needs of the youth who play the agents of Violence, thugs and Terrorism deal by tackling unemployment (Juliet Elu and Gregory Price 2015) and proper reintegration of Nigerian Youths into the Labour Market, Employ the political ideology of republican’s quota with the proper rule of law, balance of power and dividend of Democracy, set legitimate standard with Massive sensitization process for separation of Religion from the State

(Government) and place Religion in subordination to the state with its operation been regulated within the parameters of Law to control its contingencies, prosecute perpetrators and Mediators of Terrorism, Develop Anti-Political Radicalism Law and Policies, Develop Economic surveillance Agency for Political Radicalism and Terrorism to monitor and cutting off the financing of terrorism and illegitimate political practices etc.

For over fifty years of post-colonial independent era, Nigeria politics is marked with radical style of political Culture which should be readjusted through the legislative process to become acceptable to all Nigerians in other to achieve a stable economic and political system. Nigeria must pursue clearly identified political development, political finesse and reasonable economic growth through credible structural mechanism.

The Nigerian leadership approach to achieve the above lofty goals must be dominantly tied to stable political and enduring social systems that clearly support selfless service, honesty of intents, actions and transparency in all ramifications to prevent the influence of a *radical political culture*. The military era caused a chain of drastic effect of lack of civilian freedom, Relegation of the Constitution to the background, instability of government as different Governments were overthrown, political leaders assassinated, and opposition silenced. There was pronounced corruption, presence of incompetent and inefficient personnel, and lack of legitimacy and stagnation which often conflict with the objectives of Nigerian political parties and political ideologies which provides a justification for the general needs of the people (Jessica Ezenagu , 2018).

With the level of terrorism and its political objectives in Nigerian, it is indirectly becoming a political culture that focuses on alteringsocial and legitimate political structures and changing value systems in fundamental ways which will initiate the ideology of indigenous politics where ethnic groups will be canvassing for their political objectives at the national level. As such, Terrorism will be replaced with the politics of Ethno-Tribal Dominance (ETD) as **PR5** because of the political interest of the indigenous group as a whole, reintegration of agents of Terrorism into the indigenous politics, and the political dogma of a radical protection of ethnic interest through its mouth speak socio-cultural organization like Afenifere for the Yorubas, Ohaneze Ndigbo for the Igbos, Arewa Consultative Assembly for the Hausas, Uzo-Utiv social-political organizations for. ETD will be set up as a resistance mechanism against government political policies perceived as bias and inequitable, and a radical political culture designed to usher in indigenous civilization with a political philosophy of indigenization into the Nigerian public administration and its political system. As a result, the tendency of clashes of ethnic civilization and the contest of indigenous supremacy is certain to challenge secular political culture. With the development of indigenous socio-cultural organizations fomented by stakeholders, ETD will either be hybridized into a dynamic political culture that can cause the tendency of Nigerian disintegration into many indigenous nations that will reflect their distinctive ethno-tribal political identity like Biafra Republic reflecting Igbo republicanism, Odudowa Republic with Yoruba Ethno-traditional monarchial system with quasi democratic administration etc or the high

tendency of conflict of ethno-tribal Dominance as apolitical radicalism (PR5) is certain to replace the already tackled Terrorism because the proponents of agitation, indigenous quest for protection of resources located within its Land Mark, incorporation of proponents of the agitation, and the struggle to partake of national cake because of constant disappointment of political representatives coupled with increased distrust against Nigerian politicians by Indigenes; all will contribute to the driving force of ethno tribal politics which will cause conflict of ethnic civilization in Nigerian Politics.

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