

COMBATING THE BOKO HARAM TRANSNATIONAL SPREAD: THE IMPERATIVE OF BORDER SECURITY

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Abstract

Despite the efforts and progress made by Nigerian government to combat Boko Haram insurgency, the Boko Haram is still a threat to national security not only in Nigeria but to other countries in the Lake Chad region. Therefore, this paper critically examined the strategy of combating the Boko Haram transnational spread in the Lake Chad region with focus on border security. This paper specifically aimed to examine the extent of Boko Haram's transnational spread; identify the relevance of border security for combating the Boko Haram transnational spread and suggest appropriate measures for effective border security for combating the transnational spread of Boko Haram activities in Lake Chad region. This paper adopted the theory of transnationalism as a framework of analysis. The data were collected through secondary sources and analysed qualitatively. It was observed that as a result of unsecured borders in West Africa and lake Chad region in particular, the Boko Haram has achieved transnational spread based on the manifestation of its activities (terrorist attacks) in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republic. This paper also argued that effective border security is very essential for countering the Boko Haram transnational activities because it would help to prevent or reduce the rate of the cross border terrorist attacks; curtail the boko haram's collaboration with other terrorist group; reduce the boko haram's trafficking of arms and other trans-border criminal activities. It was suggested among others that to adequately combat the boko haram transnational spread, there is need for adequate use of modern ICT gadgets; cooperation and collaboration among members of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF); strengthening the border security agencies etc.

Keywords: Border security, Boko Haram, Transnational Spread, Transnationalism

Introduction

The level of states capability to secure their borders affects the extent to which they protect their territory against any potential threat. Therefore, combating any terrorist activities requires effective border security. This is in line with spencer's view (cited in

Onuoha, 2013) that “the border is the first line of defence against terrorism and last line of a nation’s territorial integrity.” In addition, Okumu (2011) asserts, “borders are also rebel groups best friends.... Insecure borders have greatly contributed to severe security threats such as insurrection, incursion and terrorist activity.” The porous nature of a border is a potential threat to state stability, national security and territorial integrity while a consolidated border has been identified as essential for building stable states and achieving national security (Ikome, 2012).

Nigeria is a vast country that covers 923,768 square kilometers with about 36,450 kilometers of land and waters/maritime borders (Okeke, Oji & Okechukwu, 2014; Danfulani, 2014). Nigeria is situated in the Gulf of Guinea and shares border with Benin Republic in the West, Niger and Chad in the North and North-east respectively and Cameroon in the North-east and South-south. It shares lake borders with Chad and Niger and Maritime borders with the Gulf of Guinea and Atlantic Ocean. Nigeria has sea, air and land borders with land entry points which constitute over 99% of the borders and followed by airports (Danfulani, 2014).

The emergence of Boko Haram insurgency can be traced to 2002 headed by Mohammed Yusuf. In 2009 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, the Boko Haram was transformed into a violent and terrorist group by using the tactics like shooting, use of explosive device, assassination, rape, destruction of property, suicide bombing etc (Ekwonna, 2016; Onuoha, 2014; Onuoha, 2016; Boko Haram, 2016). The Boko Haram terrorism has expanded its operations from Nigeria to other countries like Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Since 2014, it has transformed as internal security threat to a regional security or transnational threat, which is as a result of its intensification of cross-border attacks (Onuoha, 2016; Bearzotti, Geranio, Keresztes & Mullerova, 2015). Furthermore, the Boko Haram cross-border terrorist activities have enabled the boko haram to form an effective alliance with other terrorist groups in other countries such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab etc.

Despite several counter-terrorist measures, the Boko Haram insurgency has continued to launch attacks in Nigeria and other neighbouring countries, which has led to loss of lives and properties. It has shown that the Boko Haram activities in Nigeria and across borders have led to about 20,000 losses of lives and displacement of about 2.3 millions citizens (Boko Haram, 2016). The transnational spread of the Boko Haram attacks have been associated with the challenge of effective border security (poor border security) in Nigeria and its neighbouring states (Abayomi, 2013; Bearzotti et al, 2015; Menner, 2014; Adetula, 2015). This poor border control or security has been as a result of porous nature of the borders, corruptions, abuse of ECOWAS protocol, challenges of globalization, problem of logistics, underdevelopment of the border areas etc (Menner, 2014; Abayomi, 2013; Akinyemi, 2013; Gbemre, 2016; Hahanou, 2016; Opanike & Aduloju, 2015; Nosiri & Ibekwe, 2017; Danfulani, 2014). This unsecured borders has strengthen the Boko Haram terrorist activities which helped to transform it from a national threat to regional security threat in Africa and also facilitated the trafficking of arms, humans and other illegal goods by Boko Haram.

The aim of this research is to show the extent of the boko haram transnational spread; explain the need for effective border security towards combating the boko haram transnational spread and identify suitable measures for effective border security for combating the boko haram transnational spread in the Lake Chad region. In this paper,

the data/ information were sourced through secondary sources and analyzed qualitatively. In addition, the scope of this work focuses on the Boko Haram operations in Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad.

Conceptual Clarification

a. **Border Security:** Willes (cited in Predd, Davis & Brown, 2010) sees border security as “the control of cross-border movement with the ultimate goal of reducing illegal flows and not (unduly) limiting legal flows.” Okumu (2011) views that generally border security include:

- i. Geographical control of a boundary through patrol by the military or special border patrol
- ii. Immigration by internally enforcing laws
- iii. Migration by controlling the transnational movement of people
- iv. Enhancing enforcement of the immigration and migration law by asking questions that assist in screening people using the border
- v. Enhancing inspections through searches to ensure that harmful products or individuals do not enter into a country
- vi. Detecting and preventing criminals and illegal persons, goods, drugs and weapons as well as other prohibited items, from entering a country.

In this work we defined border security as the state of protecting the country against any illegal cross-border flows like illegal drugs, illegal migration, illegal arms and ammunitions etc that pose a threat to the survival of a state. In other words, border security means the prevention of illegal movement of goods and persons across borders that can serve as a threat to national security and development.

b. Transnational Reach/ Spread: This means the activities that have move from the national level to international level. That is, moving ones operation from one nation-state to other nation-states.

c. Boko Haram Transnational Spread: This means the constant increase of boko Haram’s terrorist operations from Nigeria to other neighbouring countries in the Lake Chad Region.

Theoretical Framework

This work adopted the theory of Transnationalism. The theory of transnationalism (which can also be seen as a concept) was popularized in the early 20th century by Randolph Bourne which grown out of the increased interconnectivity between people and receding economic and social significance of boundaries among nation-state. (Transnationalism, 2016). This theory viewed that increase in interaction between non-state actors (because of globalization) across borders has led to several impacts on the capability of states. This transnational interaction can take place in one country while the effects are seen in another country (Soehi & Waldinger, 2012). “This theory or approach emphasizes the ways in which nations are no longer able to contain or control the disputes or negotiation through which social groups annex a global dimension to their meaningful practices, the notion of diaspora brings to the fore the racial dynamics underlying the international division of labour and the economic turmoil of global capital” (Transnationalism, 2016).

The relevance of this theory is that it helps to explain that the high rate of cross-border activities among people or non-state actors, most especially, the terrorist groups from different locations has served as a strong challenge to state's capability on how to ensure effective border security. As the Boko Haram interacts across borders by engaging in illegal or illicit activities, they devise several strategies on how to sustain such relations across borders. This can lead to several challenges to state's capability to control and manage its borders from unnecessary infiltrations which invariably pose a threat to sovereignty and survival of Nigerian state and other countries in the lake Chad region.

The Boko Haram Transnational Spread/ Reach

The Boko Haram has spread its terrorist operations (terrorist attacks) from Nigeria to other neighbouring countries (in the Lake Chad region) which has made it a regional issue (Karmon, 2014). This transnational reach/spread can be seen based on its cross-border attacks in Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republic.

This can be seen in Nasrullah (2015) comment, which states that "while the insurgents have lost nearly all the territories they controlled in Nigeria, the rate of unconventional attacks, particularly suicide bombings, has rapidly expanded, particularly in northern Cameroon, with the lesser amount of violent attacks hitting Chad, followed by Niger's Diffa region." This above statement shows that the Boko Haram attacks is a transnational phenomenon. The tables below shows the Boko Haram transnational operations (attacks) in the Lake Chad region.

Table 1: Showing some of the Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria from 2016 to July 2017

Date	Place of Attack	Number of Casualties/Death
6/1/16	Izageki Village	7 killed
27/1/16	Dalori, Borno State	65 killed
29/1/16	Gombi	11 killed
30/1/16	Dalori, Borno State	86 killed and about 100injured
9/2/16	Dikwa	60 killed and 78 injured
12/2/16	Village near Kachifa	8 killed
14/3/16	Village of Mussa, Askira/Uba LGA Borno State	15 dead and 6 injured
16/3/16	Umunari area of Maiduguri	25 killed and 17 injured
12/5/16	Maiduguri	6 people died
29/5/16	Bui	5 people killed, 2 injured
15/6/16	Kau-Taua	4 killed
17/6/16		24 killed
20/6/16	Wumbi	2 killed
25/6/16	Gouzoudoum & Kaldjiwa, Cameroon	4 killed
4/7/16	Borno	9 killed
12/7/16	Borno State	2 soldiers killed
10/08/16	-----	4 people killed
20/8/16	Kuruburu	7 people killed
21/8/16	Kuburuwa	11 people killed
25/9/16	Miyants & Dareijamel in Kaduna	5 killed
26/9/16	-----	4 killed
11/10/16	Borno State	5 killed

12/10/16	Maiduguri Borno	18 killed
29/10/16	Maiduguri	2 killed
5/11/16	Borno State	7 killed
8/11/16	Maiduguri	4 killed, 6 injured
11/11/16	Umulari, Maidu	2 killed
16/11/16	-----	1 killed, 8 injured
18/11/16	-----	6 persons killed
22/11/16	-----	6 killed
23/11/16	Maiduguri	2 killed
29/12/16	Madagali Town	57 killed, 177 injured
11/12/16	Maiduguri	3 killed
7/1/17	Buni Yadi Yobe	5 killed
10/1/17	-----	2 killed
13/1/17	Kangarwa village Borno State	3 killed, 27 injured
13/1/17	Madagali	9 killed
14/1/17	Borno State	2 killed
14/1/17	Borno State	3 killed
16/1/17	University Of Maiduguri	3 killed
25/1/17	Borno	3 killed and 2 wounded
25/1/17	Maiduguri, Borno	4 killed
29/1/17	Borno	7 killed
30/1/17	Maiduguri	15 killed
31/1/17	Dalori Head quarter mosque in Maiduguri	1 killed
2/2/17	Along Cameroon-Nigeria border	5 killed
7/2/17	Yobe	2 killed
11/2/17	Borno State	7 killed and 19 injured
13/2/17	Mifa Community in Chibok LGA	1 killed and 1 injured
17/2/17	Maiduguri	2 killed
13/2/17	-----	3 killed
5/5/17	Maiduguri	5 killed
13/5/17	University of Maiduguri	1 killed and 1 injured
15/5/17	Amarwa	11 killed
16/5/17	Northern Nigeria	2 killed and 7 injured
20/5/17	Borno State	7 killed and 40 injured
8/6/17	Maiduguri, Borno State	14 killed and 24 injured
9/6/17	Adamawa	2 killed and 4 injured
14/6/17	Komdi and Tuyan	10 killed and 6 kidnapped
18/6/17	Borno State	12 killed and 11 injured
20/7/17	Borno State	2 killed and 6 injured
26/6/17	Maiduguri	9 killed and 13 injured
11/7/17	Maiduguri	17 killed
15/7/17	Jere, Borno State	1 killed
17/7/17	Maiduguri	8 killed
23/7/17	Maiduguri	7 killed
25/7/17	Magumuri area of Borno State	48 killed
28/7/17	Dikwa LGA, Borono State	8 killed

Source: Timeline of Boko Haram (2017); Toromade (2017)

Table 2: Showing some of the Boko Haram attacks in Cameroon

Date	Place of Attack	Number of casualties/Death
19/2/2013	Dabanga	7 persons kidnapped
4/4/2014	Northern Cameroon	Kidnap of 3 persons
17/5/2014	Waza	1 killed and 10 abducted
28/12/2014	Cameroon far North Region	86 people killed
2/1/2015	Waza	11 people killed, 6 injured
12/1/2015	Kolofata	One officer killed
18/1/2015	Northern Cameroon	80 people kidnapped and 3 killed
4/2/2015	Fotokol	Scores of people killed
13/1/16	Kouyape	12 killed
18/1/16	Nguetchewe	4 killed and 2 injured
25/1/16	Bodo	28 killed and 65 injured
29/1/16	Northern Cameroon	4 killed and 12 injured
6/6/2016	Darak	10 people killed
14/6/16	Lake Chad, Cameroon	52 killed
25/6/16	Gouzoudoum & Kaldjiwa	4 killed
30/6/16	Djakana	15 killed
22/09/16	Djakana	3 killed
24/10/16	Far North Region of Cameroon and Waramide	6 killed
8/11/16	Far North Region of Cameroon	2 killed, 3 injured
24/11/16	Mora	4 injured
25/12/16	Mora	2 killed and 5 injured
14/01/17	Gnam-Gnam	17 people killed
30/01/17	Fotokol	1 killed and 3 injured
2/6/17	Northern Cameroon	11 killed
16/6/17	Far North Region	2 killed
22/6/17	Far North Region	6 killed
1/7/2017	City of Mora	1 person killed

Source: Timeline of Boko Haram Insurgency, 2017; Onuoha, 2014

Table 3: Showing some of the Boko Haram's attacks in Chad

Date	Place of Attacks	Number of casualties/Death
4/2/2015	Gamboru Ngala	Nine soldiers killed
13/2/2015	Ngoubana	About 10 killed
24/2/2015	Gambaru	One soldier killed & 9 injured
16/6/2015	N'Djamena	24 people killed & more than 100 injured
4/7/2015	Merom and Tiskra	26 killed
27/8/2/15	Chad's border with Niger	4 Chad soldiers killed
25/9/2016	Border with Niger	4 killed and 6 injured
5/5/2017	Lake Chad	Nine person killed

Source: Timeline of the Boko Haram Insurgency 2017; Enobi and Johnson-Rokosu, 2016

Table 4: Showing some of the Boko Haram attack in Niger

Date	Place of attack	Number of casualties/Death
6/2/2015	Bosso and Diffa	5 killed
9/7/2015	Bosso	5 killed
4/6/2016	Bosso	32 killed and 67 injured
17/6/2016	Ghafam	7 people killed & 12 injured
14/09/2016	Village of Toumour	5 Niger Army killed
8/11/2016	Banibagou	5 Nigerian soldiers killed & 3 injured
21/1/2017	Southwest Niger	Two person killed and 7 injured
29/6/2017	Diffa Region	2 killed and 11 injured
30/6/2017	Kerawa	1 person killed
3/7/2017	Ngalewa	9 persons killed

Source: Timeline of Boko Haram Insurgency, 2017; Enobi and Johnson-Rokosu, 2016.

From the above tables, it shows the extent of the Boko Haram cross border attacks in the Lake Chad Region. These tables serve as evidence that the boko haram is now a transnational or regional issue. In table 1, it indicates that only from 2016 to July 2017 that the boko haram has killed about 740 people in Nigeria. In table 2, it shows that apart from Nigeria, Cameroon has experienced much hit from Boko Haram than other Lake Chad countries. It shows that Boko Haram has killed about 358 people in Cameroon. In table 3, it reveals that the Boko Haram attacks have killed about 87 persons in Chad while in table 4, it indicates that about 73 people have been killed in Niger Republic. Even though, the Boko Haram terrorist operations have caused more dead in Nigeria than any other country, these attacks on the three countries (Cameroon, Niger and Chad) is a threat to regional security.

The continued Boko Haram's cross-border terrorist actions have enhanced by the following:

- i. Training and recruitment of member across Nigerian borders in Chad, Cameroon and Niger.
- ii. Easy trafficking/smuggling of arms with several dealers across borders
- iii. Link with other international terrorist organizations like ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Al-shabaab etc.

Challenges of border security for combating the Boko Haram cross-border activities in Lake Chad region

Combating the boko haram transnational spread has been difficult as a result of problem of border security in the Lake Chad region and West Africa. The unsecured borders in the region have helped to intensify the boko haram cross-border activities. The study of Menner (2014, p. 14) on the boko haram cross-border activities, revealed four factors or components that made Nigerian government unable to stop the continued boko haram transnational spread in the lake Chad region to include: The long and shifting borders in the region; the deficiency of the regional militaries; the continued falling of multilateral cooperation and the Boko Haram strong ethno-linguistic and cultural cross-

border ties. Other factors that pose challenge to border security are briefly identified as follow:

- i. The porous nature of the borders in the region. Such as the 20,000 miles border Nigeria shares with Cameroon, Niger and Chad had about 1,500 illegal routes.
- ii. Poor technological facilities. These include poor ICT, poor border barrack, inadequate patrol vehicles etc.
- iii. Inadequate trained border security personnels.
- iv. The boko Haram strong cultural ties across borders.
- v. Corruption among security or government officials.
- vi. Abuse of ECOWAS protocol in terms of free movement of persons across borders in the West Africa region.
- vii. Poor cooperation among border security agencies in terms of information and intelligence sharing.
- viii. Problem of globalization.
- ix. Poor cooperation and integration between the border security agencies and local communities.
- x. Poor political will and commitment on how to effectively manage borders.
- xi. Underdevelopment of the border areas.
- xii. Poorly demarcated borders.
- xiii. Presence of cross border communities. (Okumu, 2011; Menner, 2014; Gbemre, 2016; Akinyemi, 2013; Hahonou, 2016; Danfulani, 2014; Opanike & Aduloju, 2015; Nosiri & Ibekwe, 2017; Bearzotti et al, 2015).

The Imperative of Border Security for Combating the Boko Haram Transnational Reach / Spread

Countering the Boko Haram transnational activities cannot work effectively with poor border control or security. It has been indicated that the porous nature of Nigerian border aided the Boko Haram's infiltration and successful attacks and which has spread its operations to other Lake Chad region (Bearzotti et al, 2015; Adetula, 2015). Therefore, effective border security is very essential for combating the Boko Haram transnational spread based on the following reasons:

1. Reduction or Elimination of Successful Attacks / Operations: Evidence has shown that ineffective border security and porosity of the borders constitute a great factor that strengthen the operations of Boko Haram in Nigeria and other Lake Chad regions (Mailabari & Hanidu, 2015; Bearzotti et al, 2015; Adetula, 2015; Menner, 2014). This is because the Boko Haram uses the porous boundaries between Nigeria and other countries in the Lake Chad region as a hideout in order to make plans on how to launch attacks. These insecure borders make the terrorists to move from one area to another without much resistance by both national and transnational patrol team and security agencies.

2. Reduction/Dismantling of Arms Trafficking/Smuggling: Another essence of achieving border security in order to combat the Boko Haram transnational activities is that it will prevent or drastically reduce the rate or extent of arms trafficking by the Boko Haram. The poor border security in the area has adequately aided the Boko Haram insurgency to smuggle weapons/arms from other countries to Nigeria (Onuoha, 2013, Raheem, 2015; Zenn, 2014, Menner, 2014). According to Front (2016)

The main sphere of Boko Haram's activity is the region of Lake Chad and in the North Eastern part of Nigeria where main trafficking routes are localized. The group is able to get revenue from providing logistical support to drug lords transporting heroin and cocaine to Europe through Port Harcourt and Port of Calabar in Nigeria. Any attempts to push militants from this region face a tough response of Boko Haram defending its financing sources. Now, Boko Haram is expanding its business into Port of Abidjan and Port of San Pedro and corrupting port officials in order to allow trafficking there. Another well-known transport route of drugs and arms lays through the northern part of Mali to Libya, Morocco and Algeria. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghred (AQIM) and local jihadist groups are the beneficiary party of this route. AQIM and Boko Haram don't coordinate military operations or terror acts. The only thing what unites these groups is involvement into a wide network of trafficking from the South African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic

Studies also show that the Boko Haram used both transnational and national means to traffic weapons/arms (Onuoha, 2013; Raheem, 2015). Therefore, Border security is highly needed to prevent the Boko Haram's trafficking of arms. This is because the sect will continue to launch successful attacks in the Lake Chad region if it still find it very easy to traffic or smuggle weapons/arms into its area of control. Furthermore, it has been observed that the Boko Haram has a tie with arms traffickers in smuggling of weapons or arms in order to launch attacks in Nigeria and other neighbouring countries (Zenn, 2014). A report by Zenn (2014) shows that one Chadian weapons traffickers was arrested in Waza who were working on behalf of Maroua-based Boko Haram commander and possessed \$15,000 from deals that he made in Chad. He added that the Boko Haram attacks on Cameroon is intended to serve a supply lines for receiving weapons from Chad and Lybia for use in Nigeria (Zenn, 2014). Also, it was shown that in March 2014 three Boko Haram arms dealers were arrested in extreme North Region for trafficking of the arms through Chad into Cameroon on their way to Nigeria (Menner, 2014).

3. Curtailing or Elimination of Training Camp: The effective border control will go a long way to curtail or eliminate the number of training camps in the Lake Chad Region. This is because the insured borders have aided in the formation or establishment of the Boko Haram training base in different part of the Lake Chad region (Onuoha, 2014; Bearzontti et al 2015; Guitta & Simcox, 2014; Adetula 2015).

In 2014, the French Defence Ministry asserts that the Boko Haram has 200 to 300 training camps in Nigeria and neighbouring countries like Chad, Niger and Cameroon (Guitta & Simcox, 2014). Evidence has shown that some members of the Boko Haram group were trained in different countries like Mauritania, some countries in North Africa and Middle East (Onuoha, 2014; Adetula, 2015. Bearzotti, etal, 2015).

4. Combating the Link/Network Between Boko Haram and Other International Terrorist Groups: Another important role of a secured border is that it will help curtailed the rate of cross- border networks or ties with other criminal groups. In other words, achieving border security is a prerequisite to frustrate or reduce the level of Boko

Haram's ties with other criminal and terrorist groups. Studies have identified that the poor border security and control has increase the link between Boko Haram and other terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabbeeb, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and other criminal organization that help in providing funds, training, recruitment and information sharing (Onuoha, 2014; Bearzotti et al, 2015; Adetula, 2015; Guitta & Simcox, 2014). In the same vein "President Jonathan acknowledged that Nigeria gleaned intelligence which indicated that Boko Haram runs on international network on recruitment, training and indoctrination camps like in the Gao and Kidal areas in Mali, the Diffa, Maradi and Maina Soro area in Niger Republic, Maroua and Geroua areas in Republic of Cameroon, the Zango and Ridina quarters in Ndjamena, Chad, the Raiky Kotsy area in Sudan and also some cells in the Central African Republic" (Onuoha, 2014).

Recommendations

To ensure border-security for curtailing the Boko Haram transnational spread, the following measures must be considered.

1. There is need for adequate application of technological gadgets to fight the Boko Haram cross-border activities. This technology can be in form of Close Circuit Television (CCTV) camera, surveillance drones, satellites, geographical information system, radars and alarm system. These technologies will enable the security agencies on border patrol to track down the cross-border operation of the Boko Haram insurgency.
2. Strengthening the regional security arrangement is necessary: There must be urgent need to strengthening the cooperation, collaboration of regional security forces in the West Africa and Africa at large. The strengthening of Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), Joint Border Control Commission, Multinational Joint Military Technical Cooperation (between Benin, Burkina faso, Togo, Niger and Nigeria) etc will help to combat the Boko Haram trans-border activities. These regional security arrangements can be strengthen by addressing the issue of funds, personnel and coordination.
3. Adequate training of security personnel on combating cross-border criminal activities is very essential. The security personnel involved in cross border activities need to be trained on the use of modern technology and other methods of countering cross-border criminal activities.
4. There is need to adequately monitor and identify the supply network of Boko Haram in terms of arms. This will help to reduce the rate of arms trafficking which has aided the operation of Boko Haram.
5. There must be an urgent need to strengthen the coordination and cooperation of the several security agencies involved border control or security in Nigeria and other Lake Chad region. A well coordinated effort and intelligent sharing between security agencies like the Police, Customs, immigration, Civil Defence Corps, the Military etc will go a long to ensure a secured border and curtail the Boko Haram spread.
6. The government should consider on the need to construct adequate fences, auto-gates in the border areas to prevent or reduce illegal movement of persons and goods.
7. Confidentiality of security personnel as regards to information leading to the win against boko haram insurgency is necessary.

Conclusion

The Boko Haram terrorist attacks in Nigeria and other neighbouring countries like Chad, Cameroon and Niger indicates that it is now a transnational phenomenon and a regional security issue or threat. There is no how the Boko Haram transnational spread can be effectively combated with the present unsecured borders in the Lake Chad region and West Africa. It has shown that the boko haram cross border or transnational terrorist activities has been easy as a result of the poor border security which are caused by the problem or challenges of porous nature of the border, corruption, poor logistics, poor trained personnel, inadequate technological gadgets (ICT) etc. Therefore, adequate measures must be taken to ensure effective border security to combat the boko haram transnational spread and other terrorist groups in West Africa and Africa at large.

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