

The State And Insurgency In Nigeria: An Assessment Of Boko Haram In Northern Nigeria

M. I. Abada
&
Francis Chigozie Chilaka

Abstract

Nigeria is currently entangled in the web of terrorist actions waged by the Boko Haram. This has enthroned domestic terrorism in Nigeria and devastated lives and properties. The article interrogated the impact of Boko Haram insurgency, hence examined Boko Haram attacks and increasing insecurity in northern Nigeria. The study was anchored on the Marxian theory of Post-Colonial State. The theory underscores the low level of autonomy of the post-colonial states that makes it to handle crisis with trepidation and caution. The study is basically library research hence it relied on documentary method of data collection. Data were collected from secondary sources. The article revealed that most northern states especially, Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Maiduguri have been under constant attacks by the Boko Haram while the Nigerian state as a result of its post-colonial character lacks the capacity to set the frameworks for action in society, but even where and when it does, such frameworks most often appear to be inadequate. The paper recommends, among others, that to fix the Boko Haram problem, the Nigerian government should strengthen the capacity of the security agencies, especially the Nigerian police, to be more proactive in handling threats to peace and security.

Key words: Boko haram, insurgency, state

Introduction

Two events in Northern Nigeria and Kano state in particular in the early eighties heralded the beginning of violent extremism in postcolonial Nigeria. In the first instance, the Maitatsine riots of 1980s, led to the death of thousands of people and stimulated subsequent acts of violence orchestrated by the Maitatsine Islamic sect in other northern Nigeria such as Bulunkutu, Yola, Jimeta and Gombe (Okanya, 1995; Falola, 1998). The second act was related to demolition of churches and several properties belonging to Christians by the rampaging Muslim rioters who were opposed to the construction of a church in Muslim dominated heartland in October 1982 (Suberu & Osaghae, 2005).

Since then, the rate at which acts of violent terrorism occur in northern Nigeria has been on the increase. For instance, there have been terrorist acts in Kafanchan, Zaria and Kaduna in 1987, Kano in 1990, Kano and Katsina in 1992, Zangon-Kataf in 1992 among others; although some scholars such as Suberu and Osaghae (2005); Iwara (2006); and Salawu (2010) see these violent destructions of lives and property as religious

violence that arises as a result of intolerance, existing between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria.

Arising from the rate at which lives and properties are destroyed in Nigeria, many violent extremist groups such as less famous Kala-Kato championed by Mallam Badamasi; Aminu Bashir Abdullahi led Darul-islam; Islamic Movement of Nigeria coordinated by Sheik Ibrahim El-Zakzakky; the Boko Haram which was originally coordinated by Mohammed Yusuf. Also Ahmadiya Movement organized by Al Gulan; Khadiriyyha organized by Nasir Kabara; Darika Shi'a Salafiya (or Izala) coordinated by Late Abubakar Gunmi; Tijjaniya led by Isiaku Rabi, and the Tariqqa group coordinated by Dahiru Bauchi (Suleiman, 2009; Onuoha, 2011), have emerged in Nigeria.

The return of democracy to Nigeria in May 1999 ushered in great optimism that the new political arrangement would avert or contain violent extremism in the country. On the contrary, the country has witnessed even more acts of terrorism with devastating consequences. There were instances of violence in Jos in February and September in 2001; Abuja, Bauchi and Kaduna once again in 2002; Warri, Jos and Kaduna in 2003; Wase (Yobe State) in March 2004; Yelwa (Plateau State) and Sokoto in February, 2005; and Maiduguri, Bauchi, Abuja, Jos, Kastina, Yobe, and Dutsi in 2006 (Iwara, 2006:160). Not surprisingly, an estimated 10,000 lives were lost in religious violence in Nigeria between 1999 and 2003 (Isaac, 2009).

Particularly worrisome to state security and intelligence agencies is the extremist dimension that religious violence has recently assumed, evidenced in the upsurge of radical Islamic sects seeking political and religious reforms in the country.

Of these sects, the existence and activities of the radical Islamic sect known as the *Boko Haram* is one that is now receiving much attention nationally and internationally. Since the July 2009 revolt, and more especially after the September 2010 jail break, the sect has evolved from a group that waged poorly planned open confrontation with state security forces to one that increasingly uses improvised explosive devices (IEDs), targeted assassination and bombs in its violent campaign mostly in northern Nigeria. It has mounted serial attacks on state security forces (police, soldiers, civil defence, and prison wardens, among others), community and religious leaders, politicians, and other civilians who they consider as "enemies" (Onuoha, 2012).

The broad question that remains pertinent is what the Nigerian government is doing to regulate human conduct, provide a framework for a viable social order and promoting harmonious coexistence, as her primary responsibility. This is even worrisome when the government knew of impending threat to peace and security and fails to act to forestall disorder (Onuoha, 2012). In the case of Boko Haram uprising, President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua displayed ample evidence of prior knowledge of the threat posed by the sect, when he stated that: "Definitely, our security agencies have been tracking them for years and I believe that the operation we have launched now will be an operation that will contain them once and for all" (Olajide, Umar and Kwaru, 2009:5)

In this context, the capacity of the Nigerian state to effectively prevent or contain threats to the security of life and property is called to question. Yet section 14 Sub-Section 1 of the 1999 Constitution categorically stated that *the security and welfare of the people [Nigerians] shall be a primary purpose of government* (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999:10). In other words, the essence of government is primarily to ensure law and order not only by arresting disorder, but above all by taking proactive steps to prevent the outbreak of violence

Hence, this article has been designed to examine the impact of Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria, especially in the area of insecurity. It must be stated that data for the article were gathered mainly from secondary sources such as textbooks, journals and periodicals, and other forms of written works such as seminars and workshops. The study also gleaned data from internet sources as this cannot be neglected in this age of Information Communication Technology, ICT.

Theoretical Perspective

For a profound elucidation and understanding of the limited impacts of the Nigerian state in addressing the Boko Haram insurgency, we anchored analysis on the theoretical framework of the Marxian theory of Post-Colonial State as popularized by the Third World scholars like Ake (1985:3); Ekekwe (1985:56) and others.

The theory suggests that post-colonial state is a creation of imperialism. As such, it has followed a developmental strategy dictated by the interest of the imperialists and the local allies rather than those of the majority of the indigenous population. The theory also exposes that the main goal of the colonial state was to create conditions under which accumulation of capital by the foreign bourgeoisie would take place through the exploitation of human and other local natural resources. It was on the basis of this that the post-colonial state emerged. The post-colonial state is a creation of imperialism because the local class that controlled it was a creation of imperialism. Most importantly, its interests coalesced with those of the foreign bourgeoisie. This explains why the Nigerian state has consistently been unable to tackle Boko Haram headlong because the state was not created to advance the interests of the masses that are being slaughtered everyday but that of capital.

Again, the post-colonial state is as much limited in autonomy as it reflects and caters for a narrow range of interest. It has limited autonomy because the state is institutionally constituted in such a way that it enjoys limited independence from the social classes, particularly the hegemonic social class, and so, is immersed in the class struggles that go on in the society. This lack of relative autonomy is one reason why the post-colonial state in Nigeria is incapable of mediating political conflicts and Boko Haram crisis in northern Nigeria. In fact, religion which is the driving force of Boko Haram has become a veritable tool for ethno-religious bourgeoisie because it evokes strong emotions, sentiments, arguments and touches easily on large number of people across the country. Hence, Boko Haram insurgency has at best handled with trepidation and caution. This explains the sect's insistent resistance to the federal government and continuous attacks on public institutions in northern Nigeria.

This theory is suitable in explaining the origin and escalation of Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria. This is because when Nigeria is put in its proper perspective as a post-colonial state, a state with relative low level of autonomy, it becomes evident why any issue in Nigeria is politicized and hamstringing the state from performing its role of providing security effectively. It is within this context that the limited impact of the state in nipping in the bud Boko Haram insurgency can be appreciated.

The Nigerian State and Insurgency

The state is central to the understanding of political and social theory. In modern political literature, observed Okolie and Chime (2008:347) the idea of state is often linked to the notion of an impersonal legal or constitutional order with the capacity of administering and controlling a given territory.

Liberal scholars posit that the state is a neutral institution that balances competing interests between elite groups. Hence, the state serves as the supreme guarantor of security for a populated territory. According to Miliband (1969:49), what the 'State' stands for is a number of government institutions which, together, constitute its reality, and which interact as parts of what may be called the state system". Other constituent elements in the state system include the bureaucracy, the coercive apparatus (police, army, prisons), the judiciary and the lower levels of government that exist in the formation. In this system, it is the government – not to be confused simply with the party in power – that actively represents the state (Ekekwe, 1986:10; Onuoha, 2011).

As government and regime, the State is the organisational instrument of society, which provides it with the necessary cohesive factor and maintains its unity of existence (Oyovbaire, 1980:3). In other words, the State is an objective force that holds society together. The roles of the state are many and varied, but the chief responsibility of the State is the maintenance of social and political order (Onuoha, 2011).

However, the colonial and post-colonial processes of institutionalization and legitimization of the Nigerian state has attracted many names to the Nigerian state. Leys (1976) referred to it as *over politicized state*; while Diamond (1987) sees it a *swollen state*. Again, the Nigerian State has been described variously as "comprador", "rent-seeking", "neo-patrimonial", "prebendal", "predatory", and "postcolonial". These appellations are premised on the historical specificity of post-colonial state. A specificity which arises from structural changes brought about by the colonial experience and alignments of classes and by the superstructures of political and administrative institutions which were established in that context, and secondly from radical realignments of class forces which have been brought about in the post-colonial situation (Alavi, 1971).

As Jega (2007:119) cogently argued:

These characteristics have combined with one another, and with many others, in complex dynamics, to undermine the Nigerian state's capacity to discharge those fundamental obligations of a modern state, such as socioeconomic provisioning, guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms, ensuring law and order and facilitating peace and stability as preconditions for growth and development of citizens.

As a result, the Nigerian state not only lacks the capacity to set the frameworks for action in society, but even where and when it does, such frameworks most often appear to be inadequate. This explains the link between the inabilities of the Nigerian state to nip in the bud the increasing Boko Haram insurgences in northern Nigeria. In fact, the Nigeria state is increasingly heading into a collapsed or failed state (Hartman, 1997; Widner, 1995; cited in Okolie and Chime, 2008) because most of the functions that require it to pass as a state are increasingly not met. Among these functions are security and welfare of the citizens. The legitimacy of the state's entitlement to sovereign authority over a clearly demarcated territorial domain rested upon its ability to provide various collective goods, most importantly security against external and internal threats and more recently economic welfare (Onouha, 2004:384).

Given the expected role of the state as the guarantor of security, Kwaja (2009:109) regrets that:

The inability of the state to effectively perform its core functions of providing or guaranteeing security for the people as well as act as regulator has led to a weakening of its bargaining strength and capacity in relation to the ethnic and religious groups in society, which poses a serious challenge to national security.

The result is that the continuing insurgency witnessed in the country in the last seven years raises serious questions about the effectiveness and efficiency of the state and its institutions in managing armed conflicts.

Having established the character of the Nigerian state which impinges on its ability to manage armed conflicts, an insurgency can be seen as an armed uprising against a constituted authority. It is an organized rebellion aimed at overthrowing a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. If there is a rebellion against a sovereign state and those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents then the rebellion is an insurgency. The ultimate goal of an insurgency is to challenge the existing government for control of all or a portion of its territory, or force political concessions in sharing political power. Insurgencies require the active or tacit support of some portion of the population involved. External support, recognition or approval from other countries or political entities can be useful to insurgents, but is not required.

An insurgency can be fought via counter-insurgency warfare, and may also be opposed by measures to protect the population, and by political and economic actions of various kinds aimed at undermining the insurgents' claims against the incumbent regime (see Peter, 1964).

Boko Haram: Evolution, Structure and Philosophy

There is a huge controversy surrounding the exact date of the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria (Onuoha, 2012). However, Boko Haram, whose official name is The Group of Al-Sunna For Preaching and Jihad, which is the English translation of Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad, its Arabic name but derogatively known as Boko Haram, meaning "western education is sin" can be said to have originated in 1995 in northeast Nigeria under the name of Ahlulsunna wal' jama' ah hijra (Taiwo and Olugbode, 2009:4; Onuoha, 2012:135). Another account has it that they operated in 1995 under the name Shabaab, Muslim Youth Organisation and operated from the Indimi Mosque, located along Damboa Road, Maiduguri, Borno State and had one Mallam Lawal as leader and another Mallam Usman as secretary (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko_Haram).

Record has it that in 1999, Mallam Lawan left Nigeria for further studies at the University of Medina, Saudi Arabia, thereby ultimately surrendering the leadership of the group to the late Mustapha Modu Jon, popularly known as Mohammed Yusuf. It was under Yusuf's leadership that the group acquired enormous influence and popularity, if not notoriety. Today, the name Mohammed Yusuf has become the rallying name for members of the sect, as he was said to have laid the foundation for the growth of the organization.

It is believed that the residents of Maiduguri are the ones that dubbed the sect, Boko Haram. The term "Boko Haram" is derived from the Hausa word "boko" meaning "western education" and the Arabic word "haram" meaning "sin". Thus, the name commonly translated in Hausa, means, "western education is sin". This pejorative name

is figurative of the method of the sect's operation and stout opposition to anything western. However, the organization frowns at the misinterpretation of Boko Haram and fired, as noted by one of its leaders, Mallam Sanni Umaru that:

Boko Haram does not in any way mean "Western Education is a sin" as the infidel media continue to portray us. Boko Haram actually means "Western Civilization" is forbidden. The difference is that while the first gives the impression that we are opposed to formal education coming from the West ... which is not true, the second affirms our belief in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not Education), for culture is broader, it includes education but not determined by Western Education. (see *Vanguard*, 2009: <http://allafrica.com/stories/200908140646.html>).

The particular appellation the group ascribes to itself may not be certain, but one thing is certain about the group – it is an Islamist movement which stoutly opposes western way of life, democratic institutions, constitutional laws and the institutions of the Nigerian state. It is a Jihadist movement that strives to destroy democracy and establish sharia law in Nigeria. From its recent activities, the group can also be said to be anti-Christian going by the rate it has been attacking Christians and bombing churches. The group uses the internet to propagate its activities and enhance its radicalization and circulation of violent extreme ideologies and abolition of western way of life. A 2009 *BBC* interview of Mohammed Yusuf, then leader of the group, showed that the concept of spherical Earth is grotesque to Islamic teaching and should be abolished, along with Darwinian evolutionary theory and the concept of rain originating from water evaporated by the sun. According to Yusuf:

Western-style education is mixed with issues that run contrary to our beliefs in Islam. Like rain, we believe it is a creation of God rather than an evaporation caused by the sun that condenses and becomes rain. Like saying the world is a sphere. If it runs contrary to the teachings of Allah, we reject it. We also reject the theory of Darwinism (Yusuf quoted in Boyle, *BBC*, July 13, 2009).

The rate at which most northern states embraced Islamic law (sharia) which today exist in 12 northern states since 1999 (Peter, 2012) was not sufficient to dissuade Yusuf and his foot soldiers who argued that the country's ruling class are wholly enmeshed in corruption and that Muslim leaders are mired in western way of life. Their envisaged "pure" sharia state would ostensibly be both more transparent and just than the existing order. That the group has little regard for the country's traditional Muslim hierarchy was underscored in early 2012 when its spokesman, Abu Qaqa, threatened attacks on the historic seat of the Nigerian caliphate in an open letter to the Sultan of Sokoto, Muhammadu Sa'ad Abubakar III (Peter, 2012:2).

This is not the first time Nigeria is witnessing the rise of a fundamentalists group, one of such fundamentalists was Mohammed Marwa, also known as Maitatsine, who at the height of his notoriety during the 1970s and 1980s, was sent into exile by the Nigerian authorities. More worrisomely, the spate at which Boko Haram has acquired notoriety has portrayed Muslims in Nigeria in bad light coupled with the outlandish and

unsubstantiated eternal bliss that awaits a Muslim who dies in the course of Mohammed. It must be noted in line with Peter that “Boko Haram can be described as a fanatical sect whose beliefs are not held by the majority of Nigerian Muslims”. One is not surprised with the barrage of denunciation coming from well meaning Muslims in Nigeria such as the Sultan of Sokoto, Sa’ adu Abubakar, the spiritual leader of Nigerian Muslims, who called the sect “anti-Islamic” and “embarrassment to Islam” (Sa’ adu quoted in Oladeji and Agba, 2011). Other groups such as the Coalition of Muslim Clerics in Nigeria, The Islamic Circle of North America, The Islamic Supreme Council of Canada and The Muslim Council of Britain have all condemned the group and appealed to them to disarm and embrace peace. In the same vein, the Governor of Niger state Dr. Mu’azu Babangida Aliyu has criticized the group saying “Islam is known to be a religion of peace and does not condone violence and crime in any form” and Boko Haram does not represent Islam (Aliyu quoted in *Sunday Trust*, February 1, 2012).

Boko Haram like most terrorist organizations has no clear and precise structure of evident chain of command. This is not surprising because the organizational structure of any terrorist group determines its strengths and weaknesses. Nevertheless, the main factors in such structures are their complexities - the more complex and unwieldy, the stronger, and the more difficult to dismantle and vice versa. It is in this regard that Tunde (2012) noted that:

a terrorist group may form one cell or many cells that operate locally or internationally. The disintegration of terrorist organization into smaller units called cells makes the organizational structure more complex, difficult and effective in their operations. The cells are the smallest elements of the terrorist group, yet the most effective driving force of the operation of the organization - cells serve as building blocks for the entire organization (<http://odili.net/news/source/2012/jan/8/823.html>).

Tunde went further to remark that the primary reasons for this cellular or compartmentalised structure is security. This is the reason the Nigerian Islamist BH sect seems quite elusive, operation-wise and has been able to carry out successful attacks against the Nigerian populace in recent times. Thus:

The compromise or loss of one cell should not compromise the identity, location or actions of other cells, because a cellular organizational structure (like the Boko Haram sect) makes it very difficult for an adversary to penetrate the organization. Cells are used to control members of the group - members remain in close contact with one another to provide support and, most especially, to prevent desertion or breach of security procedures (<http://odili.net/news/source/2012/jan/8/823.html>).

Those within one cell are apparently oblivious of the existence of other cells, and this makes it difficult if not impossible for information to be divulged to non members or infiltrators. This explains why the Nigerian security agencies have been unable to extract useful and intelligence information that could nip Boko Haram in the bud or at least minimize its attacks. It can now be stated that Boko Haram appears to have a loose structure. Its activities seem to indicate that leaders are scattered. For instance, some key

members of the dreaded Boko Haram sect have been arrested in different parts of northern Nigeria.

BH was formerly headed by the late Mohammed Yusuf, who it is believed founded the sect. He was thought to have been highly educated and wealthy. He had two deputies (*Na'ib Amir ul-Aam I & II*). According to Onuoha (2012) each state where they exist has its own *Amir* (Commander / Leader), and each Local Government Area where they operate also has an *Amir*. Below the Local Government *Amirs* are the remaining followers. They also organized themselves according to various roles, such as Soldiers and Police, among others (see also Da'wah Coordination Council of Nigeria, 2009:14). Although Mohammed Yusuf was killed by security forces in 2009, his deputy, Abubakar Shekau, who was initially thought to also have been killed, appeared on a video in 2010 and claimed leadership of the group. (<http://www.red24.com/members/indepth/bokoharam.php>).

However, Shekau and Mamman Nur are presently locked in a leadership crisis as to who is the current leader of the group, but no one comes out to say he gives any order. It appears that those that bomb in North East are different from those in Suleja and other parts in northern Nigeria. According to Uduma, in Maiduguri, it is said that 26 fundamentalist groups exist alone with different names and structures (http://www.mobileafrik.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3097:how-nur-shekau-run-boko-haram&catid=10:nigerian-news).

However, in a 25-minute video clip, shot on April 19, 2010 and obtained by the media showed Shekau answering questions from a journalist at his hideout, showed him proclaiming himself as leader of the sect. With the death of the former leader, he "being the deputy (to Yusuf), stepped in and assumed leadership to continue in the pursuit of religious knowledge." Shekau was, besides being a second-in-command of the sect, the most influential and feared member of the Boko Haram group. Nur's name has previously circulated as a top figure within Boko Haram and he was considered by some to be the sect's third-in-command during its 2009 uprising in northern Nigeria. During the attack in which Shekau was claimed to have been murdered by security forces, Nur took over temporarily as leader while Shekau recovered from gunshot wounds suffered during the uprising. With the recovery of Shekau, rumours have it that there has been a power struggle between Nur and Shekau, with Nur and his faction of loyalists contending he was more competent to lead the sect given his exposure to Somali training and contacts. Investigations had shown that Nur working in concert with two other suspects masterminded the attack on the United Nations, UN, building that left at least 23 dead.

According to Onuoha (2012) Boko Haram draws its members mainly from dissatisfied youths, unemployed graduates and former *Almajiris* (Street Children), mostly in northern Nigeria. A lack of education and a high unemployment rate in northern Nigeria has given the group a seemingly bottomless reservoir from which to draw disgruntled youth recruits. Nigeria's State Security Service estimates that Boko Haram has over 540,000 members (<http://www.red24.com/members/indepth/bokoharam.php>). The sect also has some well educated, wealthy and influential people as members. For instance, Alhaji Buji Fai, an ex-commissioner in Borno State; Kadiru Atiku, a former university lecturer; and Bunu Wakil, a Borno-based contractor, are known to be members of the sect (Onuoha, 2012:137). The group's membership is also thought to be bolstered by extremist elements from Chad, Niger and Cameroon who cross over the notoriously porous northern border regions into Nigeria.

In terms of funding, it is believed that highly-educated, affluent and influential people such as contractors, university dons, businessmen, former retired force officers and politicians who have sympathy for the sect constitute its major financiers. For instance, in recent time, the media was awashed with information of the arrest of Alhaji Bunu Wakil, a contractor and 91 other persons alleged to be the main financiers of the Islamic sect (Idris, 2011). According to Onuoha (2012), members also pay a daily levy of 100 naira to their leader. This provided the basic source of funding for the sect, augmented by the resources from other well-meaning Nigerians such as Alhaji Bunu Wakil. It is also believed that the sect have external financiers. Sources confirmed that while the organization relied on donations by its members in its earlier days, its links with Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) opened it to funding from groups in Saudi Arabia and the UK (Taiwo, 2010).

According to the sources, different confirmations coming from sources in Boko Haram had indicated clearly that a group known as Al-Muntada Trust Fund, with headquarters in the United Kingdom, had extended some financial assistance to the sect. Investigations, so far, revealed that the sect received financial assistance from some Islamic organizations (Taiwo, 2012). In fact, a security report submitted to the presidency indicated that the extremist sect had sometime received a huge financial donation of N40 million from a group in the North African country precisely Algeria. The report, a product of a joint police and military investigations and raids, carried out in Kano and Sokoto in December 2011 indicated that the Algerian sect gave out the funds as its first instalment in a planned long term partnership with Boko Haram (Ogala, 2012).

Increasing Incidence of Boko Haram Attacks in Northern Nigeria

The philosophy of Boko Haram is rooted in promoting the practice of orthodox Islam. Meanwhile, orthodox Islam condemn Western civilization and working in the civil service because it contaminates Islamic doctrine. This explains why the sect is popularly known as the BH, literally meaning “Western education is a sin” (Boyle, 2009). BH can be described as deviant fanatical sect that questions the beliefs of majority of Nigerian Muslims. In their denunciation of Western civilization, Peter, (2012), notes that it abhors the legitimacy of the secular Nigerian state, invariably described as *dagut* (“evil”) and unworthy of allegiance, and wishes to wage war against it in an effort to replace it with a “purified” Islamic regime.

This extreme position of Boko Haram or practice of “pure Islam” came about with the emergence of Mohammed Yusuf as the leader of the sect who accused the committee of Shaykhs of corruption and deposed the committee who appointed him in 2002 as leader for working contrary to Islamic tenets thereby rendering the realization of “pure Islam” a distant dream and the overthrow of the Nigerian state a difficult task. According to Onuoha (2012:3):

In its early transformative years to an extremist movement, the Boko Haram under Yusuf’s leadership strove for self-exclusion of its members from the mainstream corrupt society by living in areas outside or far away from society in order to intellectualize and radicalize the revolutionary process that would ultimately lead to violent overthrow of the Nigerian state. By disassociating from the large society, members became more indoctrinated by the ideologues who inculcated in them anti-secular ideologies.

The above observation by Onuoha, became the root of violent extremism of members of the sect. However, this violent extremism was veiled until 2009 when the sect unleashed monumental violent attacks on Nigeria in July 2009. This, among others, left over 1000 people dead (Onuoha, 2012). Since then, the group has not relented in its destruction of lives and properties in Nigeria. In fact, in 2011, BH perpetrated at least 450 killings in Nigeria (Aljazeera news, December 12, 2011). Reports equally had it that the sect was responsible for over 620 deaths within the first 6 months of 2012 (Haruna & Bashir, 2012).

Islamic insurgency has made it difficult for citizens and even foreigners to exercise their rights of freedom of movement and association. In most areas of Bornu, Yobe and Adamawa States in Nigeria, people cannot gather for any leisure or social activity including marriages because of frequent attacks or the threat of attacks by Boko-Haram militants. It is on records, that militant activities of Boko-Haram, took control of 25 local government areas in Bornu State out of 27 local government areas and many others in Yobe State. In other words, until recently, when Emergency rule was declared in three states of Bornu, Adamawa and Yobe in May 13, 2013, Boko Haram rendered political activities in them useless. The institutions and governance structures in most part of these three states were rendered redundant (Simon, et al. 2013).

In the mix of this insecurity, parents have to withdraw their children and wards, some undergraduates of higher institutions in the states affected have also sought admissions in equivalent schools in the south. Governments have been forced to also close down some of the schools in the most notorious areas that the sect has major hold. This has worsened the illiteracy rate in a region where illiteracy rate is as high as 80 percent, with many children roaming the streets (Simon, et al. 2013).

Boko-Haram crises and anti-insurgency operations and general insecurity had uprooted or displaced over 6000 people in north-eastern Nigeria. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) maintained that 6,240 people have taken refuge in Niger Republic for safety reasons. Others from Adamawa have also crossed over to Cameroun and Chad republics since the crises started in 2009 (UN, 2013; Simon et al. 2013).

The Boko-haram has created insecurity of lives and property. Studies (Njadvara, 2013; Folarin, 2013, Simon et al. 2013) have shown that the activities or mayhem by the Boko-Haram have destroyed over 8000 lives, and more than 4000 buildings across Northern Nigeria. The militant attack alone in Baga, left more than 2,275 buildings destroyed and 183 bodies of dead victims, including 36 terrorist (Human Right Watch, 2013). And more recently, precisely on Tuesday, August 13, 2013, more than 56 worshippers were slaughtered in a mosque in Bornu State (Famutimi, 2013).

Assessing the cost of the menace of Boko Haram, it must be noted that several lives have been lost and properties worth millions of naira have also been destroyed; and investment opportunities have equally declined especially in northern Nigeria.

The attacks discouraged investors and even led to disinvestment. Kano State, which used to be a vibrant commercial center with huge textile industry, has seen the loss of many businesses (Suleiman, 2012). According to the Minister of Information, Mr. Labaran Maku, terrorism in places like Kano, which serves as the commercial nerve-centre of not only the North, but neighboring countries like Chad, Niger Republic and Northern Cameroon, is destroying the Northern economy. He argues as follows:

The attack on Kano is so significant because the city has always been the commercial centre of Western Sudan for the past 500 years, ever before the evolution of Nigeria. So, when you destabilize peace in Kano you threaten the foundation of economic and social well-being of the northern region (Suleiman, 2012:48).

Besides, the loss of human lives, there has been a mass exodus of non-indigenes, the loss of whose contributions to the economies of the concerned states has been detrimental to the states. Islamic militancy across the globe has proven to be a great source of insecurity in the world let alone when it confined within a particular region in Nigeria. Specifically, the emergency rules declared in Bornu, Adamawa and Yobe states by the Federal Government showed that security had collapsed in these states.

Table 1 showing some of the Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria between July 2009 to November 2013.

Date of attack	Place of attack	Number of persons killed
July 27,2009	Attack on Potiskum, Yobe State. Divisional police headquarters	Three policemen and one fire service officer died.
March 13, 2010	Another sect operation in the northern part of Jos, plateau State,	Resulted in the death of 300 people.
September 8, 2010	Bauchi central prison was set ablaze	Members of the sect freed.
October 1 2010	Explosions near the Eagle square, Abuja,	Claimed 12 lives, leaving many Injured.
December 24, 2010	A bomb attack in Barkin Ladi, Jos, Plateau State.	8 people killed.
December 31, 2010	Explosion at Mogadishu Mammy Market, Abuja,	Claimed about 10 lives.
January 21, 2011	The Borno state governorship Candidate of All Nigeria peoples party, ANPP, for the 2011 election, Alhaji Modu Gubio, brother state.	Alhaji modu Sheriff, Killed by sect members alongside six others in Maiduguri, Borno State.
March 2, 2011	Mustapha Sandamu, at Rigasa area of Kaduna State	Boko Haram killed two policemen Attached to the residence of the Divisional Police Officer,
March 30, 2011	Bomb planted by Boko Haram in Damaturu, yobe state exploded	And injured a police officer.
April 8, 2011	Bomb at INEC office in Suleja, Niger State, claimed lives of	Eight corps members and a suicide bomber
April 9 , 2011	Bomb explosion occurred at a polling Unit in Unguwar Doki, Maiduguri, Borno state	Killing the suicide bomber
April 26, 2011		Three people killed and scores injured in bomb attack.
April 29, 2011	Army Barracks in Bauchi	Number of persons Killed not

	Bombed	disclosed by the military authority
May 19, 2011	In bomb attack	Three policemen killed and two soldiers injured
May 29, 2011	Explosion at mammy market of in shandawanka barracks in Bauchi state.	Claimed lives and left many injured
May 30, 2011	Bombs exploded early morning on Baga road in Maiduguri, Borno State, Borno state,	13 dead and 40 injured.
June 7, 2011	Series of bomb blasts occurred in Maiduguri,	Claiming five lives and leaving several others injured.
June 16, 2011	Bomb blast at Damboa twon, Maiduguri, Borno state	4 children killed
June 16, 2011	Nigerian police headquarters Abuja, bombed by a suspected suicide bomber,	Three killed and many vehicles damaged.
June 20, 2011	Bokok Haram stormed Kankara police station in Katsina State.	Seven policemen killed and two of the security men guarding a bank opposite the station were also killed.
July 9, 2011	A clash between Boko Haram and the military in Maiduguri. Also in Suleja, Niger State. A bomb targeted at a church.	35 people dead and many others injured.
July 11, 2011	Tragic explosion at a relaxation joint in Fokados Street, Kaduna	No casualty recorded.
July 12, 2011	Boko Haram threw an explosive device on a moving military patrol vehicle,	Claimed five lives.
July, 15, 2011	Explosion in Maiduguri	Injured 5 people.
July 23, 2011	An explosion close to the palace of the Shehu of Borno, Abubakar Garbai Elkanem,	Injured 3 soldier
July 25, 2011	Bomb explosion near the palace of a traditional ruler	Claimed 8 lives
August 25, 2011	A bank robber by the sect members	4 policemen, I soldier killed and civilians and carted away undisclosed sum of money
August 26, 2011	A suicide bomber drove into the United Nations building in Abuja,	23 killed and 60 injured.
September 12, 2011	Attack on a police station in Misau Bauchi state.	Seven people, including four policemen, killed during the bombing
September 13, 2011	Sect members shot in an attack in Maiduguri, Sortly after the	4 Soldiers injured

	arrest of 15 sect members during military raids on Boko Haram hideouts in Bauchi State	
September 17, 2011	Brother-in-law of Mohammed Yusuf, the slain leader of Boko Haram, Babakura Fugu, Shot dead in Maiduguri by two member of the sect two days after he was visited by former president, Olusegun Obasanjo.	Babakura Fugu, killed
October 3, 2011	Boko Haram attacked Baga market in Maiduguri	Killed 3 people
November 4, 2011	Boko Haram attack in Damaturu, Yobe State.	About 150 people killed
November 27, 2011	Attack in Geidam, Yobe State.	7 people
December 18, 2011	Bomb detonated in Shuwari, Maiduguri, Borno State	3 members of Boko Haram were killed
December 22, 2011	Explosives and gunshots	4 people killed and left several others injured.
December 24, 2011	Bombing in Jos, Plateau State	About 80 people killed
December 25, 2011	Christmas Day Bombling in Madalla, Niger State	About 50 people died
December 30, 2011	Bomb attack in Borno State	Seven people killed in Maiduguri
January 5, 2012	A church Attack by Boko Haram members in Gombe State	About 6 people died
January 6, 2012	Attack in the Christ Apostolic church, Yola, Adamawa state	17 people died and 20 Igbo people were also killed in Mubi in the same State.
January 20, 2012	Multiple attacks in Kano.	About 250 people killed
January 22, 2012	Two churches destroyed in Bauchi State; The headquarters of Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area in the state.	2 military personal, a DPO and 8 civilian also killed
January 26, 2012	The Sabon- Gari area of Kano state witnessed another explosion, which caused another pandemonium in the state	Many inured and some luxury buses were damaged in the explosion.
February 26, 2012	Headquarters, Church of Christ in Nigeria, COCIN in Jos	3 female worshippers killed and 50 others wounded including Yiljap Abraham state Commissioner for information.
February 28, 2012	Boko Haram Bombed primary schools at night, both Muslims and Christians attend the schools.	Not fewer than 5,000 primary school pupils and their teaches have been forced to stay at

	In Gomari Costain primary school and three others in kulagumna, Budum and Abbaganaram are affected in the attack.	home. No casualty recorded as the attack took place in the night.
May 2012	Christian Worshippers at the Old Campus of Bayero University Kano	20 Persons Killed, including 2 Professors.
May 31, 2012	Danbare surburd, along Gwarzo highway, Kano, during JTF's rescue operation of kidnapped German expatriate.	Kidnapped German and six others killed.
June 3, 2012	Church bombed at Bauchi state	15 Christian worshippers killed and several others injured.
August 2, 2012	The city of Maiduguri	9 construction workers working at the Shehu of Borno Central Mosque killed.
3 October 2012	In the town of Mubi in Adamawa state	Around 25–46 people were massacred in the town of Mubi in Nigeria during a night-time raid.
18 March 2013	At a car bay in Sabo Gari Kano State	At least 22 killed and 65 injured, when a suicide car bomb exploded in Kano bus station.
7 May 2013	In Bama Town Yobe state	At least 55 killed and 105 inmates freed in coordinated attacks on army barracks, a prison and police post in Bama town.
6 July 2013	Yobe State school shooting	42 people, mostly students, were killed in a school attack in northeast Nigeria.
Nov. 2, 2013	Firgi Area in Maiduguri	13 persons were killed on Saturday along Firgi Area while 27 persons were killed on Thursday in Gulumba attack, which also left 12 others injured.
Nov. 7, 2013	Maiduguri	Attack on a wedding convoy that killed the groom and more than 30 family members.

Source: Suleiman, (*Tell*, February, 6, 2012:44-45); and updated by the authors

In fact, Boko Haram attacks in northern Nigeria has become so worrisome that it will not be an overstatement to state that, there is no day in Nigeria one does not hear about the killings and destruction of lives and properties by Boko Haram. Further, a close

observation of the sect's menace and the rate at which it attacks its targets, shows that these attacks are likely to continue since the Nigerian state has shown an apparent and obvious weakness in checkmating the nefarious activities of the group.

In fact, Yobe state Governor, Malam Ibrahim Gaidam, lamented that the military troops deployed to the state to combat the dreaded Boko Haram insurgents are ill-equipped for the assignment. He therefore called on the federal government to provide the soldiers with high profile military weapons for them to be able to tackle the Islamist insurgency plaguing the state. He regretted that while the insurgents were using heavy machinery such as machine guns, anti-aircraft machines, among others, the security men were only left with AK-47 rifles to confront them with, which he said was inadequate (see *Peoples Daily*, October 29, 2013). In the same vein, Sunday Ehindero, former Inspector General, at the House of Representatives Ad Hoc Committee on Review of the 1999 Constitution's retreat in Port Harcourt, capital of Rivers State on May, 26, 2013, noted that the country's police force was not trained to combat crimes at night adding that due to lack of adequate training and modern equipment, no policeman could contend with the hi-tech crime prevalent in the country today. Also, he noted that robbers have graduated from robbing at night to breaking banks with grenades; a situation he said surpasses the capability of the ill-equipped Nigerian police.

Again, participants at the Commanding Officers' Workshop 2012, identified ill-equipped and lack of adequately trained personnel for counter terrorism as reasons terrorist acts and Boko Haram insurgency continue unabated in the country (see, *Nigerian Tribune*, Monday, 11 June, 2012).

CONCLUSION

The article investigated Boko Haram insurgents in Northern Nigeria. It further x-rayed the evolution and philosophy of Boko Haram, and how it draws its members and funds. The structure and leadership of Boko Haram were further brought into critical examination. This provided a logical coherence to understanding the ramifications of Boko Haram and possible exploration of its acts of extremism in Nigeria.

The article revealed that most northern states especially, Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, have been attacked by Boko Haram. Again, with the ineptitude of Nigerian security agencies, these attacks are likely to continue in near future.

The paper recommends that to fix the Boko Haram problem, the government will have to, among other options, aggressively pursue a strategy that will draw on the support of the northern political class for a peaceful negotiation with members of BH. More fundamentally, the Nigerian government should strengthen the capacity of the security agencies, especially the Nigerian police, to be more proactive in handling threats to peace and security. Building the capacity of the Police would entail, among others, providing them with adequate equipment and logistics, capacity building on intelligence gathering and exchange, and joint training exercises on counter-insurgency operations.

References

- Ake, C. (1985) "The State in Contemporary Africa" in C. Ake (ed.) *Political Economy of Nigeria*. London and Lagos: Longman.
- Alavi, H. (1971) "The State in Post-Colonial Societies—Pakistan and Bangladesh", *New Left Review*, (74):59-80.

- Boyle, J. (2009) "Nigeria's Taliban Enigma". *BBC News* 31 July. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8172270.stm>.
- Ekekwe, E. (1985) "State and Economic Development in Nigeria" in C. Ake (ed.) *Political Economy of Nigeria*. London and Lagos: Longman.
- Ekekwe, E. N. (1986) *Class and State in Nigeria*. London: Longman.
- Falola, T. (1998) *Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies*. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press.
- Famutimi, T. (2013). B' Haram kills 56 in Borno Mosque, village attacks. <http://googletrender.com/streams/blog/2013/08/12/bharam-kills-56-in-borno-mosque-village-attacks/>
- Haruna U. & Bashir A. (2012) "Boko Haram Prison Break: Radical Sect Frees 40 In Nigeria". *The Huffington Post*, 4 June, 2012.
- Human Rights Watch (2013) "Boko-Haram Violence Persists despite Emergency". *The Nation*, Tues, July, pp. 6-7.
- Idris, H. (2011) "Boko Haram Financier, 91 others in Police Net". *Daily Trust*, 1 January.
- Iwara, U. E. (2006) "Religious Violence in Nigeria: Causes and Consequences", *Sophia: An African Journal of Philosophy*, 8(2): 153-157.
- Jega, A. M. (2007) *Democracy, Good Governance and Development in Nigeria*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.
- Kimball, C. (2002) *When Religion Becomes Evil*. San Francisco: Harper San Francisco.
- Leys, C. (1976) "The Overdeveloped Post Colonial States: Re-evaluation". *Review of African Political Economy*. Vol. 3. No. 5
- Miliband, R. (1969) *The State in Capitalist Society*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- Okanya, D.O. (1995) "Religion and Violence in Nigeria: the Maitatsine Rebellion Explained", in Dan O. Okanya (ed.) *Great Issues in Nigerian Government and Politics*. Enugu: Department of Political Science, Enugu State University of Science and Technology.
- Okolie, A.M.N. & Chime, J. (2008) "Electoral Process and Contradictions in Africa". *Journal of International Politics and Development Studies*. Vol.4. No.2
- Olajide, A. Gusau, I.U. & Kwaru, M.I. (2009) "Soldiers Shell Sect's Enclave". *Daily Trust*, 29 July.
- Onuoha, J. (2004) "Globalization, the State and the Challenges of Unemployment in Nigeria" in J. Onuoha & P.U. Okpoko (eds.) *Ethnic Nationalism and Democratic Consolidation: Perspectives from Nigeria and United States of America*. Nsukka: Great AP Express.

- Onuoha, F.C. (2011) "The State and Management of Religious Violence in Nigeria: A Case of the July 2009 Boko Haram Revolt". A Ph.D Seminar Paper Presented to the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka
- Onuoha, F.C. (2012a) "The audacity of the Boko Haram: Background, Analysis and Emerging Trend". *Security Journal*. Vol. 25, No. 2, 134–151.
- Onuoha, F.C. (2012b) *Boko Haram: Nigeria's Extremist Islamic Sect*. A Report by Al Jazeera Centre for Studies.
- Onuoha, J., Odoh, S.I. & Chilaka Francis (2012) "Boko Haram Threats and Global Security: Exploring United States Interest". *Anambra State University Journal of Peace and Development Studies*, Vol.1 No.1.
- Oyovbaire, S. (1980) "The Nigerian State as a Conceptual Variable", in C. Edogun (ed.) *Nigeria: Politics, Administration and Development*. Port Harcourt: Nigerian Political Science Association, University of Port Harcourt.
- Peter, P.J. (2012) "Boko Haram's Evolving Threat". *Africa Security Brief*. No. 20.
- Peter P. (1964) *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine*. London: Pall Mall Press.
- Salawu, B. (2010) "Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: Causal Analysis and Proposals for New Management Strategies". *European Journal of Social Sciences*, 13(3): 345-353.
- Simon O. E. et. al. (2013) "Islamic Militancy and Global Insecurity: An Analysis of Boko-Haram Crisis in Northern Nigeria". *Canadian Social Science*, Vol. 9, No. 5, 2013, pp. 31-36
- Suberu, R. & Eghosa, E. O. (2005) "A History of Identities, Violence and Stability in Nigeria", *CRISE Working Paper* No.6
- Suleman, T. (2012), "Boko Haram Siege Deepens". *Tell*, No 5, February 6.
- Taiwo, A. (2012) "Boko Haram's Funding traced to UK, S/Arabia, Sect planned to turn Nigeria into Afghanistan, Arrested kingpin opens up" Available at: <http://tribune.com.ng/index.php/front-page-news/35888-boko-harams-funding-traced-to-uk-sarabia-sect-planned-to-turn-nigeria-into-afghanistan-arrested-kingpin-opens-up>. Accessed 14th June, 2013
- Tunde, A. (2012) "Facts about Boko Haram". Available at: <http://odili.net/news/source/2012/jan/8/823.html>. Accessed 14th June, 2013
- Vanguard (2009) "Nigeria: Boko Haram Resurrects, Declares total Jihad" Available at: <http://allafrica.com/stories/200908140646.html>.